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Abstract 
If a company is unable to distinguish individual consumers by observable characteristics, but 
has some aggregate knowledge regarding unobservable consumer characteristics, versioning 
might be a successful pricing strategy. This thesis takes an in-depth look into different forms 
of versioning theory to gain a richer understanding of the theories’ underlying mechanisms. 
The theory is then used to construct a model of consumer demand for mobile phone 
subscriptions with internet access. The purpose is to figure out whether it would be 
profitable for Telenor to attempt a versioning strategy where two distinct quality versions of 
mobile phone subscriptions are offered: one with mVoIP access, and one without mVoIP 
access.   
The Benchmark Monopolist model shows that versioning is potentially profitable in a 
monopolist setting depending on the implementation cost. The profitability of versioning is 
driven by a market expansion effect. When a new low-quality product version is introduced, 
new customers with low willingness to pay for quality are included in the market. Limiting 
mVoIP access will also help to diminish the cannibalization of telephony services.  
In a competitive setting, the success of versioning is conditioned on the ability of the market 
actors to cooperate. If all telecom companies in the market implement a versioning strategy, 
they are all better off. However, incentives to deviate from cooperation complicates the 
prospects of reaching a stable versioning equilibrium in a market with intense price 
competition. Strong and clear signaling and the threat of retaliation are necessary to hold 
market actors in line.   
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1. Introduction 
Many telecommunications companies are expressing concern with the rise of free Voice 
over Internet Protocol (VoIP) services, such as Skype and Viber, in recent years. In an article 
published by the financial news agency E24 (2012), Swedish telecom companies say they are 
developing the capability to block access to VoIP programs on mobile phones (mVoIP), 
claiming such services are costing them too much in lost revenues. With this option in hand, 
it would be possible to change the terms of mobile phone subscriptions. Consumers will 
have a choice between a subscription allowing access to programs like Skype or an 
alternative subscription without such access. If consumers vary in their willingness to pay for 
access to mVoIP, telecom companies could exploit this heterogeneity among consumers to 
segment the market and price discriminate.  
The Chief Information Officer for the Norwegian telecom company Telenor, Anders Krokan, 
said in the same article (E24, 2012) that they are monitoring the situation closely. Telenor 
has no official plans to do what their Swedish counterparts are trying to do, but they are 
considering possibilities of a solution through a shared initiative with other market actors. In 
this master thesis, I wish to test the viability of a strategy based on versioning mobile phone 
subscriptions by limiting mVoIP access to consumers. The thesis question is:  
 
Is it profitable for Telenor to pursue a strategy of versioning by creating two types of 
mobile phone subscriptions: one with access to mVoIP services, and one without access to 
mVoIP services? 
 
Due to the somewhat limited scope of a master thesis in economic analysis, I will keep my 
main focus on the economics of the problem. In the analysis it is assumed that restricting 
mVoIP access would be both legal and technically feasible. However, it is worth noting that 
the European Commission is currently exploring issues surrounding the restriction of access 
to legal services, like Skype, on the internet (E24, 2012). It could be considered a breach of 
the net neutrality principle, so the question of legality is not fully settled.  
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We start by taking a look at some important terms and the characteristics of the telecom 
market in Norway. After having established the industry conditions, we move on to the 
relevant economic theory. Versioning and theories closely related to this form of price 
discrimination will make up the majority of the theory section. The main body of the paper is 
the theoretical analysis and the application of the analysis to the thesis question. In 
conclusion, the most important points of the analysis are summarized and an answer to the 
thesis question is presented.   
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2. Industry terms and market characteristics  
In this section we first give a short description of what VoIP actually is and of this 
technology’s potential. Moving on from there, characteristics of the Norwegian telecom 
market are presented. This will include trends in subscriptions, traffic, revenues and market 
shares. Finally, the most important trends in the industry with relation to the thesis question 
are summarized. 
2.1 VoIP 
Voice over Internet Protocol, or VoIP, itself is a technology that allows for speech to be 
turned into digital data packets. This type of technology is commonly used to make phone or 
video calls. By transforming speech into a digital format, it can easily be sent over the 
Internet to other devices with internet access. The digital format also allows for easy 
manipulation of the content and flexibility in what kind of phone services can be provided. 
With this technology service, providers can develop a variety of applications that are not 
possible or practical over the traditional telephone network (Werbach 2005). The term 
mVoIP simply refers to VoIP used on mobile devices (Picard 2011).   
 
2.2 Subscriptions 
According to the Norwegian Post and  
Telecommunications Authority (NPT) the 
traditional fixed-line telephony market is 
currently shrinking in Norway. From the end  
of the first half of 2010 to the end of the first 
half of 2011, the number of fixed-line 
telephony subscriptions fell by 115 000. In 
table 1 we see that there has been a decline in 
subscriptions of about 7% per year from 2009  
to 2011. The drop was driven by a sharp  
decline in PSTN and ISDN subscriptions, which  
fell by about 10% per year over the same period (NPT 2011, page 10).  
Fixed-line 
telephony 
subscriptions 
 
 
2010-2011 
 
 
2009-2010 
Change in 
number of 
subscriptions  
 
- 6.8% 
 
-7.0% 
Table 1: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 10). 
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The drop in PSTN and ISDN subscriptions was only slightly offset by a small increase in VoIP 
subscriptions. The overall negative trend in the fixed-lined market has persisted since 2001 
and has been increasingly negative over time (NPT, page 10). Approximately 4-in-10 
households did not have a fixed-line subscription at the end of the first half of 2011 (NPT, 
page 12). Based on these trends, it would seem that consumers are moving away from fixed 
telephony to other forms of voice services, i.e. mobile telephony or non-fixed-line VoIP, or to 
other forms of communications altogether. 
 Given the trends we see in the fixed-line 
telephony market, what is happening in the 
mobile telephony market? From the end of the 
first half of 2010 to the end of the first half of 
2011 the number of mobile telephony 
subscriptions grew by 2.7%, or by 148 000 
subscriptions. The year before, the percentage  
increase was twice as large. Overall there were  
more than 5.67 million mobile telephony  
subscriptions by the end of the first half of 2011  
(NPT, page 12).The increase in mobile telephony subscriptions is primarily driven by an 
increase in post-paid subscriptions, as illustrated bellow (NPT, page 13):  
Growth in mobile telephony subscriptions 
 
Mobile 
telephony 
2010-2011 2009-2010 
Change in 
number of 
subscriptions  
 
2.7% 
 
5.3% 
Table 2: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 12). 
Figure 1: Graphic taken from NPT report (2011, page 13, figure 2) shows the highly persistent growth 
in mobile telephony subscriptions. 
10 
 
Moreover, the residential segment constituted 77% of the subscriptions at the end of the 
first half of 2011, and this customer group has roughly held that same market share in 
mobile phone subscriptions in recent years (NPT, page 13). 
Moving on to mobile data, NPT divides this market into three segments (page 13):  
 Dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions 
 Internet access via ordinary mobile telephony subscriptions 
 Telematics subscriptions  
The dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions are not a part of the mobile telephone 
subscriptions, but purely used for data traffic purposes. Internet access via ordinary mobile 
telephony subscriptions is data use related to mobile phone subscriptions. For some 
subscriptions, consumers pay a fixed fee per month and get a “free” data packet included in 
that deal. Consumers then have a specific quota of data they can use per month for free, and 
only pay extra for data used in excess of that quota. Although this is part of the - internet 
access via ordinary mobile telephony subscriptions - category, the NPT keeps track of such 
data packet subscriptions as an individual category as well, sometimes separating them from 
ordinary mobile telephony subscriptions. The telematics subscriptions are used for machine 
to machine (M2M) communication (NPT, page 13).  
By the end of the first half of 2011, there were over 640 000 dedicated broadband 
subscriptions with an increase of 144 000 subscriptions since the end of the first half of 
2010. The residential customers made up 60.3% of the market. Looking at the mobile 
telephony subscriptions with data packets, there were 474 000 such subscriptions by the 
end of the first half of 2011. The number of these subscriptions grew by 235 000 since the 
same time the year before, i.e. the segment doubled in size over the space of one year. 
Residential customers made up 37.0% of this mobile data segment. If you combine these 
two segments of the mobile data market, the division between residential and business 
customers is about 50/50 (NPT 2011, page 14).  
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In NPT’s report we find a clear illustration of the high growth in mobile data subscriptions: 
Growth in mobile data subscriptions 
 
Figure 2: Graphic taken from NPT report (2011, page 15, figure 4) shows the rapid growth in mobile data subscriptions 
over recent years. 
The telematics market is more or less shared between Telenor and Netcom. According to the 
NPT, the number of SIM cards used for M2M communication has grown significantly, and 
this market seems to have a high potential for future growth. By the end of the first half of 
2011, the number of such SIM cards were about 600 000, with a growth of 108 000 from the 
same time the year before (NPT, page 15). 
As we can see from these numbers, the mobile telephony market is growing as the fixed 
telephony market is shrinking. In addition, the market for mobile data is increasing at a rapid 
pace. We will continue with a more thorough look at the traffic volumes from the fixed and 
mobile telephony markets in Norway.  
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2.3 Traffic 
Within fixed-line telephony, the time-charged  
calls, which makes up most of this market, 
have been declining since 2001. In table 3 we 
see a sharp decline in call minutes between 
2009 and 2011. According to the NPT (page 
22), the drivers behind the decline in traffic are 
the rise of mobile telephony, social media  
messaging services and the transition from  
dial-up internet to fixed broadband. Fixed  
network to fixed network traffic is responsible  
for the majority of the decline in the fixed-line  
telephony market. The residential customers  
are responsible for 61.0% of the fixed network  
traffic, but this group’s share of traffic has been  
declining since 2006 (NPT, page 22). 
 
Mobile-originated traffic measured in call 
minutes increased by 3.3% from the first half 
of 2010 to the first half of 2011. The prior year, 
the percentage increase was more than twice 
as large. According to the NPT (page 24), data 
from the past decade or so indicates that the  
growth in mobile call minutes is in the process  
of leveling out. Average voice traffic increased  
each year from 2003 to 2010. In the first half of  
2011, there was a slight but not significant  
decline compared to the first half of 2010. The  
data also shows that the vast majority of calls  
from mobile phones are within the mobile  
network, i.e. to other mobile phones  
(NPT, page 24).  
Fixed-line 
telephony 
2010-2011 2009-2010 
Change in call 
minutes  
- 14.0% -13.0% 
Mobile 
telephony 
2010-2011 2009-2010 
Change in call 
minutes 
3.3% 7.7% 
Table 3: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 22). 
Table 4: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 24). 
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Mobile-to-mobile traffic is also responsible for most of the growth in mobile phone calls: 
Growth in mobile-originated traffic 
 
Figure 3: Graphic taken from NPT report (2011, page 24, figure 12) shows increase in mobile-originated traffic. 
Looking at messages sent by mobile telephony we include SMS, MMS and content messages. 
Content messages are made up of ringtones, logos and other content. Total number of 
messages peaked in 2009, and then declined each year until 2011, by 75 and 123 million 
messages respectively. SMS messages make up the majority of messages with a 92.0% share. 
As we can see in table 5, the average number of messages sent per month per user has been 
declining from 2009 to 2011 (NPT, page 24-25): 
 
Mobile phone 
messages 
2011 2010 2009 
Average number of 
messages sent per 
month per user 
 
97 
 
105 
 
112 
 
  
Table 5: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 25). 
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77,0 % 
4,4 % 18,6 % 
Data traffic first half of 2011 by 
subscription   
Dedicated mobile 
broadband 
Mobile telephony 
subscriptions with 
data packets 
Ordinary mobile 
telephony 
subscriptions 
Total data traffic, combining dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions and ordinary mobile 
telephony, increased sharply between 2009 and 2011: 
Total data traffic (w/o 
telematics) 
2010-2011 2009-2010 
Increase in data traffic (in 
million Gbytes) 
2.32 1.5 
Growth in data traffic 53.0% 53.0% 
 
 
Of the total data traffic in the 
first half of 2011 dedicated 
mobile broadband 
subscriptions made up the 
majority with a share of 77.0%. 
In this dedicated mobile 
broadband segment, the 
residential customers  
constituted 78.4% of the traffic. 
The share of total data traffic 
related to the mobile telephony 
subscriptions with data packets  
was 4.4 %, up from 1.7% from the  
first half of 2010. The data traffic  
associated with other ordinary  
mobile telephony subscriptions  
was 1.24 million Gigabytes in the  
first half of 2011, which was 18.6%  
of total data traffic. The amount  
of this type of traffic is up from  
430 000 Gbytes in the first half of  
2010 (NPT, page 25-26). 
Figure 4: Graphic is a rendering of graphic found in NPT report (2011, 
page26, figure 15).  
Table 6: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 25). 
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Of the total traffic charged per minute from  
both mobile and fixed-line telephony, mobile  
traffic is increasing its share. In table 8 below,  
we can see how mobile’s share has changed 
between 2009 and 2011. Total traffic fell from 
2010 to 2011 as mobile traffic increased. In 
summary, the total traffic from mobile and  
fixed-line telephony has fallen by 63 million  
minutes from the first half of 2001 to the first  
half of 2011 (NPT, page 26-27). Behind this  
overall trend, fixed-telephony has been in  
decline while mobile telephony has grown,  
as table 7 illustrates. 
 
Trends in traffic 2011 2010 2009 
Mobile’s share of 
total traffic charged 
per minute from 
both mobile and 
fixed telephony 
 
 
68.0% 
 
 
54.0% 
 
 
59.0% 
 
 
2.4 Revenues 
After looking at both subscriptions and traffic we,  
now move on to the revenue side. In fixed-line 
telephony, there has been revenue decline of  
12.7% from the first half of 2010 to the first half of 
2011. In monetary terms, this was a drop from 
NOK 3.013bn to NOK 2.630bn between these two 
periods. Table 9 provides a breakdown of the 
revenue changes in fixed-line telephony. When we  
Change in traffic 2010-2011 
Change in overall 
traffic 
-3.0% 
 
Change in mobile-
originated traffic 
3.0% 
Changes in fixed-
line revenues 
2010-2011 
Overall  -12.7% 
Traffic to fixed  -24.0% 
Traffic to mobile  -18.0% 
Calls abroad -13.0% 
Table 9: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 28). 
Table 7: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 27).  
Table 8: Data taken from NPT report (page 26) shows an increasing mobile share of total traffic.   
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look at where the decline was most pronounced, we find that traffic to fixed networks is 
responsible for most of the revenue loss. Of the decline in revenues, NOK 200m came from 
the residential market and NOK 183m from the business segment. (NPT 2011, page 28). 
According to NPT’s numbers, over the period from 2003-2011 the growth of revenues from 
mobile services, not including dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions, seems to be 
leveling out. The increase in revenue from the first half of 2010 to the first half of 2011 was 
only NOK 35m compared to a NOK 308m increase over the previous year. Furthermore, 
revenues from both SMS traffic and time-charge calls declined. As a share of total mobile 
services revenue, subscription revenues are increasing as both SMS and time-charged calls 
are decreasing their shares. Time-charged calls still make up the biggest share of total 
revenue (NPT 2011, page 30). 
Total mobile data revenue in the first half of 2011  
was NOK 1.39bn, up from NOK 983m in the first  
half of 2010. Of the total mobile data revenue, 
dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions make 
up the majority share with NOK 612m, followed by 
ordinary mobile telephony subscriptions and 
mobile subscriptions with a data packet. 
Telematics’ share is the smallest. Mobile  
subscription with a data packet increased its  
revenue from NOK 71m in the first half of 2010 to  
NOK 243m in the first half of 2011. Among the  
dedicated mobile broadband and data packet  
subscriptions, residential customers generate  
51.0% and 36.0% of revenues respectively. As table 10 shows, combined mobile telephony  
and mobile data revenue increased from the first half of 2010 to the first half of 2011, but  
mobile telephony revenue alone fell at the same time. This shows that it is mobile data 
driving the revenue growth in the mobile segment, as other mobile telephony services 
seems to be stagnating or perhaps just leveling out (NPT 2011, page 31-32).  
 
 
Revenue changes 
(NOK million) 
2010-2011 
Mobile telephony 
and mobile data 
143 
Mobile telephony 
(w/o mobile data) 
-264 
Table 10: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 32) 
shows that mobile telephony revenue, excluding 
mobile data, is declining.  
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Trends in the mobile segment are illustrated in figure 5 below: 
Mobile data and mobile telephony revenues 
 
Figure 5: Graphic from NPT (2011, page 32, figure 20) showing the trends for mobile data and mobile telephony 
revenues. 
2.5 Market shares 
After looking at the big picture for the entire telecom market and its various market 
segments, we now take a closer look at the companies who compete for market shares in 
this changing industry. In the fixed telephony segment, Telenor is the dominant player with 
the biggest market shares. This is true for traffic, revenues and subscriptions. However, 
Telenor’s competitors have been successful in gradually chipping away at the company’s 
dominant position in recent years. In the table below you can see how Telenor has lost 
ground in all of the three categories mentioned above between the first half of 2003 and the 
first half of 2011 (NPT 2011, page 35-36): 
Telenor’s market shares in 
fixed telephony 
2011 2003 
Subscriptions 65.0% 96.0% 
Revenues 66.6% 81.8% 
Call minutes 58.5% 68.0% 
 Table 11: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 35-36) showing Telenor losing ground in the fixed telephony market. 
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It seems that in fixed telephony Telenor, is being  
affected by both a shrinking fixed telephony market 
and increased competition. 
We move on to look at the mobile telephony 
segment. Telenor is less dominant in this area. In the 
first half of 2011, Telenor had roughly a 50 % share 
in ordinary subscriptions, call minutes, SMS 
messages and revenues. Its closest rival is Netcom, 
with market shares around 18-22% in the above 
mentioned categories. For a more detailed look at 
the market shares, please take a look at table 12 
(NPT 2011, page 37).  
In the mobile data segment, including both  
residential and business customers, Telenor had a  
market share of 54.7% of dedicated mobile data  
subscriptions by the end of the first half of 2011.  
Netcom had a market share of 25.2%. The second 
largest competitor would be ICE, who had a market 
share of 12.0 %. Looking at the residential and the 
business segments separately, we see that Telenor is  
doing better among business customers than with  
residential customers. The opposite is the case for  
both Netcom and ICE. In table 13 we see that Telenor  
had around 53% and Netcom about 22% of mobile  
data revenues in the first half of 2011. Mobile data  
revenues include dedicated mobile broadband,  
mobile telephony with data packets, ordinary mobile  
telephony and telematics (NPT 2011, page 38-39). 
 
Market shares in mobile 
telephony 
2011 
Ordinary subscriptions - 
Telenor 
49.4%  
Ordinary subscriptions - 
Netcom 
17.7% 
Call minutes – Telenor 50.4% 
Call minutes – Netcom 19.1% 
SMS messages – Telenor 53.2% 
SMS messages - Netcom 21.6% 
Revenues - Telenor 53.6% 
Revenues -Netcom 18.2 % 
Market shares of 
mobile data revenue 
2011 
Telenor 53.2% 
Netcom 22.3% 
ICE 6.4% 
Tele2 5.5 % 
Table 12: Data taken from NPT report (2011, 
page 37) shows Telenor and Netcom’s market 
shares. 
Table 13: Data taken from NPT report (2011, page 
39) shows Telenor with the highest share mobile 
data revenue.  
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2.6 Industry summary 
According to international comparison done by NPT (2011, page 49-51), Norway has the 
cheapest fixed telephony services among OECD countries. This analysis is based on 
consumption levels set by OECD baskets and adjusted for purchasing power parity (PPP). In 
the mobile telephony segment, Norway is ranked among the five cheapest countries in the 
OECD. Norway’s position in this segment depends on the assumptions that are made 
regarding consumption levels. For 30 calls per month, Norway is the cheapest; for 100 calls 
Norway is number 3; and for 300 calls Norway is number 5. Given these statistics, it would 
seem that the Norwegian telecommunications market is highly competitive compared to 
other telecom markets in developed countries.  
It seems clear that the telecom industry in Norway is rapidly changing. One very pronounced 
trend is consumers moving away from fixed-line telephony and towards mobile, and mobile 
data is growing particularly fast. Telenor is losing ground in areas where they have 
historically dominated. In both fixed and mobile telephony, Telenor has had a declining 
market share as other telecom companies like Netcom have challenged them. 
Given that consumers are becoming more concentrated in the mobile segment, the 
potential market for free mVoIP services is growing and becoming a more serious threat to 
the telecom industry’s revenue streams. As revenues from mobile data and mobile 
telephony combined are increasing, mobile telephony revenue alone is declining. Time-
charged calls and SMS revenues in the mobile segment are driving the decline. With laptops 
and tablets that come with built-in video cameras and microphones, and the growth of 
smart phones, all consumers have to do is decide to download mVoIP software, which is 
usually free. Apple already includes an mVoIP application called FaceTime, which allows for 
video calling, as a built-in feature in their newest iPhone models.    
With intense competition in the Norwegian telecom market, it is hard for telecom providers 
like Telenor to capture more consumer surplus without being punished by competitors. The 
pressure to keep prices low seems to be strong, at least compared with other OECD markets. 
It is very easy for a consumer to switch providers, so Telenor must tread carefully or risk 
losing customers to Netcom or other telecom companies. Even so, some adjustment by 
Telenor to the new reality of how people communicate seems vital to maintain a 
20 
 
competitive edge in the future. Could versioning be at least part of the answer for how 
telecom companies can successfully adapt to a changing world of communication?  
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3. Theory  
In this section we will go through some of the important economic theories relevant to the 
thesis question. We start by taking a general look at price discrimination before focusing on 
versioning, which is a specific form of price discrimination. The intuitive Varian (2000) model 
offers a simple illustration of how versioning may be profitable for a company and also 
increase consumer welfare. Afterward I present a more detailed versioning model by 
Belleflamme (2005) is presented, which is based on a slightly different set of assumptions 
than the Varian model. Towards the end of the theory section, we take a look at some basic 
game theory, and how competition may affect the outcome of versioning. 
3.1 Price Discrimination 
There are a variety of definitions for the term price discrimination. According to Stole (2007, 
page 2224):  
“Price discrimination exists when prices vary across customer segments in a manner that 
cannot be entirely explained by variations in marginal cost.” 
This definition of price discrimination allows for the possibility that the marginal cost of 
providing a product or service may differ between certain consumer groups. Varying 
marginal cost would justify the price not being identical for all consumer groups. For 
instance, first class passengers on planes get better in-flight service and more flexibility with 
their ticket. They pay more for the same basic service of being transported from A to B in 
order to receive these extra conveniences. But if the extra cost of accommodating a first-
class passenger, compared to accommodating an economy class passenger, is less than the 
difference in ticket prices for these two groups, we have price discrimination by Stole’s 
definition.  
Two important conditions that determine when price discrimination is feasible are: 
1) Arbitrage is too costly to enforce the “law of one price” ( Tirole 1988, pages 134-135) 
2) The seller has at least some market power (Pindyck & Rubinfeld 2005, page 381) 
Number one states that it is not profitable or practical for a consumer who is offered a 
cheaper product version to resell it to a consumer who is offered a more expensive product 
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version. In other words, the transaction costs are too high for someone to be able to buy low 
and sell high. Number two says that the seller must have some market power to be able to 
influence prices. We know that in a market with perfect competition, the seller has no 
influence over prices, and has to set output so that marginal cost is equal to the market 
price. Any price higher than the market price would lead to the seller losing all customers to 
competitors (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005, page 267). Therefore, there has to be imperfect 
competition for the seller to have market power.   
A common way to look at price discrimination is to divide it into three categories: first-, 
second-, and third-degree price discrimination. First-degree price discrimination, also called 
perfect price discrimination, allows the seller to capture the entire consumer surplus. With 
perfect information about every customer, the seller sets a different price for each individual 
consumer equal to the consumer’s reservation price. The reservation price for a consumer is 
the maximum amount of money the consumer is willing to pay for the product. First-degree 
price discrimination is not a pricing strategy that is easy to implement in practice. The 
reasons for this are the lack of information about consumers, and the fact that such widely 
divergent pricing tend to create arbitrage opportunities (Tirole 1988, page 135).  
With the more realistic assumption of having imperfect information about consumers, the 
seller could attempt to design product packages to incentivize consumers to self-select the 
package intended for them. This pricing strategy is based on an aggregate knowledge about 
consumer preferences, which are unobservable on an individual basis. It is called second-
degree price discrimination. Versioning is a form of second-degree price discrimination, and 
we will shortly explore this strategy in detail (Tirole 1988, page 135).  
Sometimes the seller may be able to distinguish some characteristics regarding the 
consumers that might be useful, such as age or gender. The seller may then try to price 
discriminate based on these observable characteristics. This is known as third-degree price 
discrimination (Tirole 1988, page 135). Typical examples of third-degree price discrimination 
include student and senior discounts on various products and services. We now move on to 
Varian’s (2000) versioning model. 
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3.2 Varian’s model of Versioning 
 
To clearly describe the theory of versioning, I will start with perhaps the simplest and most 
intuitive model. Varian’s (2000) work on versioning of information goods shows how this 
form of price discrimination may both increase profits for a monopolist and increase welfare 
for consumers. In this rendition of the Varian (2000) model, my main focus is on versioning’s 
effect on the monopolist, as this aspect is most relevant for my thesis question.  
According to Varian (2000, page 190), versioning, also referred to as quality discrimination, 
occurs when the seller offers different versions of the same good, each with a different 
quality and price level. By versioning, the seller may be able to segment the market based on 
customers’ willingness to pay (WTP) for quality. An important condition for versioning to 
work is that the consumers are heterogeneous in their WTP for quality. If the opposite were 
true, and each consumer valued quality equally, then versioning would not be more 
profitable than a simple one-price strategy for the monopolist.  
Versioning as a pricing strategy makes sense particularly for information goods. As Varian 
explains (2000, page 190), information goods often have low to near-zero marginal cost of 
reproduction but high fixed costs of production. These goods are therefore not well suited 
for the traditional cost-based pricing model, which is more useful for goods with a positive 
marginal cost. A better pricing strategy for information goods would be a price based on the 
consumers’ valuation of the product, i.e. value-based pricing. 
Varian (2000, page 192) assumes that the monopolist is unable to segment the market by 
observable characteristics, like age, gender, or likewise. In other words, the monopolist 
cannot simply charge different prices to each individual customer based on their 
appearance. This leaves out the possibility of both first- and third-degree price 
discrimination. The monopolist is then left with the self-selection method of second-degree 
price discrimination. To succeed in segmenting the market, the seller must design the 
different product versions such that they satisfy the self-selection constraint described by 
Varian (2000, page 193): 
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“the seller wants to choose price/quality packages so that the consumers with high WTP 
choose the high-price/high-quality package, and the consumers with low WTP choose the 
low-price/low-quality package.” 
The self-selection constraint is the crux of versioning. The essential part is that the high-WTP 
consumers sees the alternative low-price/low-quality package as an unacceptable 
alternative to the high-price/high-quality package. By creating a low-quality version, and 
reducing the quality of this version sufficiently, the monopolist is able to charge a higher 
price for the high-quality version to the high-WTP consumers, without risking that they 
instead choose to buy the low-quality version.  
We now move on to an illustration of Varian’s (2000, page 191-194) versioning model with 
two distinct consumer groups. A certain fraction of the population,  , represents high-WTP 
consumers, and the rest,     , represents the low-WTP consumers. Varian (2000, page 
194) assumes that the parameter     
 
 
, which means that the low- and high-WTP 
consumer groups are equal in size. However, I will take a more general approach and also 
analyze how different values of   will influence the results of versioning in this model.   
The monopolist has information regarding the aggregate distribution of the WTP among 
consumers, but he is unable to distinguish which group an individual consumer belongs to. In 
other words, the monopolist knows something about the value of   and makes his decisions 
on how to design the price/quality packages based on this information. Varian (2000, page 
191) also assumes that the marginal cost of adjusting, either improving or degrading, quality 
is zero. However, the model can be altered for cases where the marginal cost of quality is 
not zero. The zero marginal cost of quality assumption is not unreasonable for information 
goods, since format or quality of digitalized information can easily be manipulated at low or 
approximately zero marginal cost. 
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Figure 6 illustrates the versioning model with two distinct consumer groups: 
 
Figure 6: This is a rendering of the graphic used by Varian to illustrate his model (2000, page 194). 
In figure 6 we see two distinct marginal WTP-curves. The blue and red curve represents the 
high- and low-WTP consumers respectively. On the x-axis, the quality level of the good is 
described. The further away from origin we move along the x-axis, the better the quality of 
the good becomes. On the y-axis, the marginal WTP for quality is described. The further we 
move away from the origin along the y-axis, the higher is the marginal WTP for quality. The 
blue and red curve illustrates the relationship between the two dimensions, quality and 
marginal WTP for quality, for the consumer groups.  
The WTP-curves intersects with the x-axis at the quality level where the consumers have a 
zero marginal WTP for quality. We can see that the red curve crosses the x-axis at the   
  
quality level, i.e. the low-WTP consumers gain no additional value from improving quality 
beyond this level. Similarly, the high-WTP consumers have zero marginal WTP for quality 
beyond a level of   
 , where the blue curve crosses the x-axis. Between the origin and   
 , 
the low-WTP consumers have a positive marginal WTP for quality. This means that the 
monopolist could improve the quality of the product within this interval and charge a higher 
price, as the consumers would then value the product more. Conversely, if the monopolist 
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reduced quality within this interval, the consumers would be willing to pay less. The same is 
true for the high-WTP consumers in the interval between the origin and   
 . 
To find the prices the monopolist can charge for the different product versions, we need to 
look at the area beneath the marginal WTP-curves. The area beneath the marginal WTP-
curves, bound by the y-axis and a given quality level, represents the reservation price the 
consumer has for that particular quality level. To clarify, the low-WTP consumer has a 
reservation price equivalent to the area A for a product version of quality   
 . Similarly, the 
high-WTP consumer has a reservation price equivalent to the area A + B + C for a product of 
quality   
  (Varian 2000, page 193).  
3.2.1 One price/quality  strategies 
Varian (2000, page 193-194) goes on to describe various scenarios for both one price/quality 
and two price/quality strategies. We start by examining one price/quality strategies: 
1) Set one price/quality → produce one product with   
  quality and charge A + B + C → 
sell only to high-WTP consumers 
2) Set one price/quality → produce one product with   
  quality and charge A → sell to 
both consumer groups 
Lets first look at the outfall of strategy one. If the seller only produces one high-quality 
product with quality   
 , and sells it at a price A + B + C, only the high-WTP consumers will 
buy the product. The low-WTP consumers will not buy the product since it would give them 
a negative consumers surplus in this case. Therefore the profit made by this strategy is equal 
to (Varian 2000, page 192): 
         
This equilibrium is clearly not Pareto efficient since the seller could also sell to the low-WTP 
consumers without being worse off (Varian 2000, page 192). A Pareto efficient equilibrium 
refers to a state where none of the market actors, consumers or producers, could be made 
better off by another feasible resource allocation without making someone else worse off 
(Tirole 1988, page 6). However, by selling to both consumer groups the monopolist risks 
hurting his profit potential from the high-WTP consumers (Varian 2000, page 192). We will 
look closer at this complication for the two price/quality strategies later on. 
27 
 
In the second case, the seller only produces one high-quality product version with the same 
quality level,   
 , but sets a lower price at A. This is at no extra cost to the monopolist than 
selling one low-quality version,   
 , at price A, since the marginal cost of quality is assumed 
to be zero. In this case both high- and low-WTP consumers will choose to buy the product. 
The profit for the monopolist from this pricing strategy is (Varian 2000, page 192): 
           
   
The high-WTP consumers now have a positive consumer surplus of value B + C, while the 
low-WTP consumers have zero consumer surplus. This solution is Pareto efficient since no 
one can be made better off without making someone else worse off. Note, however, that if 
the monopolist instead had produced one low-quality version,   
 , at price A, this would not 
be a Pareto efficient solution. The profit would still be the same for the monopolist but the 
high-WTP consumers would now only have a consumer surplus equal to B, ergo they are 
worse off.  
Now we will analyze which one of these one price/quality strategies is the most profitable 
for the monopolist. The number one strategy of only selling to the high-WTP consumers is 
more profitable for the monopolist if: 
           
               
          
   
 
  
If this condition holds, the monopolist will choose to only sell to the high-WTP consumers. In 
other words, the low-WTP consumers will be excluded from the market. If the inequality is 
reversed:   
      
   
 
   
and this condition holds, the most profitable strategy is serving both consumer groups. We 
can see from this expression that the value of   is important in determining the direction of 
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the inequality sign. As the value of   approaches zero, the expression on the right side of the 
inequality will approach infinity. This tells us that a low value of   will mean that it is more 
profitable to sell to both consumer groups. Since a low value of   indicates that there are 
very few high-WTP consumers relative to low-WTP consumers in the market, this is a 
reasonable conclusion. On the other side, if   approaches 1, indicating a high share of high-
WTP consumers in the market, the expression on the right side approaches zero, and serving 
only the high-WTP consumers will be most profitable.  
3.2.2 Two price/quality strategies 
Let us consider the case of producing two versions of quality   
  and   
 , at prices A and A + 
B + C, respectively. The high-WTP consumers will receive zero consumer surplus from buying 
the high-quality version, but they will receive a positive consumer surplus of B from buying 
the low-quality version. Therefore, the high-WTP consumers choose to buy the low-quality 
version. This is a violation of the self-selection constraint that was described earlier, as the 
monopolist fails to segment the market (Varian 2000, page 193).  
To comply with the self-selection constraint and avoid risking the high-WTP consumers 
buying the low-quality product, the seller can set a maximum price of only A + C for the high-
quality product. With the high- and low-quality product versions priced at A and A + C, 
respectively, the high-WTP consumers would be indifferent between them. Both versions 
now give them a consumer surplus of B. Therefore, the strategy including the quality pair   
  
and   
  will gain the monopolist a maximum profit of (Varian 2000, page 193): 
                 
Maximum profit for quality pair (  
 ,   
 )        
It is however possible to increase the seller’s profits even further through versioning. 
According to Varian (2000, page 194) the optimal strategy is defined as follows:  
 
“The seller will continue to reduce the quality of the low-quality bundle until the marginal 
reduction in revenues from the low-WTP consumers just equals the marginal increase in 
revenues from the high-WTP consumers.”   
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By reducing the quality of the low-quality product from   
  to   
  , the seller can support a 
higher price for the high-quality product,   
 . This goes back to what was earlier referred to 
as the crux of versioning. The goal is to make the low-quality alternative sufficiently 
unacceptable for the high-WTP consumers. We degrade the quality of the low-quality 
product so that we do not have to reduce the price of the high-quality product to satisfy the 
self-selection constraint. As the quality of the low-quality product is reduced, the monopolist 
must also accept a lower price for this version. This gives us the two effects Varian 
mentioned in the quote above. As the monopolist reduces the quality of the low-quality 
product, he marginally increases his revenues from high-WTP consumers, as he can now 
charge a higher price for the high-quality product. At the same time, the monopolist 
marginally loses revenue from the low-WTP consumers, as he is forced to cut the price of the 
low-quality product when the quality of this version is degraded.  The optimal amount of 
quality reduction is given by the equilibrium state where these two marginal effects equal 
out to zero.  
Here is an illustration of the optimal versioning strategy: 
 
Figure 7: This is a rendering of the graphic used by Varian to illustrate his model (2000, page 194).  
When the seller marginally reduces quality of the low-quality product from   
 , he loses 
revenue equal to the marginal increase of the area D’, but at the same time he gains revenue 
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equal to the marginal increase of the area C’. This effect is illustrated by the vertical black 
line moving left from   
 . The marginal increase of the area D’ represent the loss of revenue 
from low-WTP consumers, and the marginal increase of the area C’ represents the increase 
in revenue from the high-WTP consumers, as the quality level of the low-quality product is 
diminished.  
Starting at   
 , we see that the marginal increase in the area C’ is larger than the marginal 
increase in the area D’, as the vertical black line shifts left. This remains true all the way until 
the vertical black line reaches   
 , where these marginal effects even out to zero. Keep in 
mind that this particular equilibrium is only optimal when    
 
 
. If   
 
 
, then the 
equilibrium point would be to the left of   
 , and if    
 
 
, it would be to the right. For   
 
 
 
, any further degrading of the low-quality good beyond   
  would have a net negative 
effect on the monopolist’s profit. By reducing the quality of the low-quality version to   
 , it 
is now possible for the seller to price the high-quality version at A’ + C’ + D’, while he can 
only charge A’ for the low-quality version. The profit for this versioning strategy would be 
(Varian 2000, page 197): 
                        
Maximum profit for quality pair (  
 ,   
 )                
The quality pair (  
 ,   
 ) priced at A’ and A’ + C’ + D’ respectively, would give the maximum 
profit possible from a versioning strategy with the given assumptions made by Varian (2000). 
This conclusion follows from the argument above: 
                         
Varian (2000, pages 197-198) illustrates the conditions that must hold for versioning to 
improve overall social welfare. As I already stated, I will instead focus on the conditions that 
must be true for versioning to improve the monopolist’s profit. However, it is worth noting 
that versioning may avoid the exclusion of the low-WTP consumers when it is most 
profitable to only sell to high-WTP consumers in a one price/quality market.  
If the quality/price pair of (  
 ,    
 )/(A’, A’ + C’ + D’) is the overall best strategy for the 
monopolist, it will be more profitable than both of the one price/quality strategies we 
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looked at earlier. For the optimal versioning strategy to be more profitable for the 
monopolist than only selling to the high-WTP consumers, the following must be true: 
                       
                                    
                  
   
 
   
   
For the optimal versioning strategy to be more profitable for the monopolist than selling 
only one quality version to all consumers, the following must hold: 
                
                        
                  
                 
   
   
 
   
In figure 6, we can easily confirm visually that both these conditions hold for Varian’s (2000) 
example, when it is assumed that     
 
 
. Therefore, Varian’s theory shows graphically that 
versioning may increase profits for a monopolist under certain circumstances. However, we 
can also see from the latter of the two conditions above that if   is sufficiently small in value 
it would undoubtedly be more profitable to have a one price/quality strategy that served 
both consumer groups. The former condition shows that a one price/quality strategy that 
only serves the high-WTP consumers is preferable when   is sufficiently close to 1. Moving 
on, we take a good look at a more mathematical model of versioning by Belleflamme (2005) 
with slightly different underlying assumptions.  
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3.3 What separates Belleflamme from Varian 
Before we begin to explore Belleflamme’s (2005) model of versioning, it is best to start by 
addressing some fundamental differences between this model and Varian’s (2000) model of 
versioning. Contrary to Varian, Belleflamme assumes that the monopolist has a choice 
between two different quality versions which are exogenously given. In other words, the 
monopolist is not able to adjust quality freely along a dimension, but is limited to two 
specific quality options. Therefore, the monopolist maximizes profit by adjusting prices. This 
is a clear distinction from Varian, who lets the monopolist maximize profit with respect to 
the quality levels of the product versions, which the monopolist can adjust freely. 
Belleflamme (2005) also expands the heterogeneity of the consumers. Instead of having just 
two different consumer groups like Varian (2000), Belleflamme (2005) assumes that each 
consumer has a preference parameter value,  , which is on the interval      . This 
parameter tells us something about how much the consumer values quality, and it is 
assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed in terms of their  -values along this 
interval. Belleflamme’s approach gives a much more varied view of consumers and how they 
may differ in their valuation of quality. 
Furthermore, Belleflamme (2005) assumes that in the case where the monopolist is 
producing only a single quality version, it is always more profitable to produce the high-
quality version than the low-quality version. By this assumption, successful versioning will 
always expand the market in Belleflamme’s model. This is an important distinction from 
Varian (2000). Belleflamme also allows the groups that buy the low-quality and high-quality 
versions to shrink and grow continuously as prices change, as long as demand is positive. In 
Varian’s model however, demand does not continuously change, but rather jumps between 
predetermined demand levels defined by the given size of the high- and low-WTP groups. 
The reason for this difference is that Belleflamme (2005) assumes a downward sloping 
demand curve. With a downward sloping demand curve, the demand for the product will 
rise as the price of the product goes down. Similarly, the demand will go down when the 
price goes up. This is true over the entire interval where demand is positive. But in Varian’s 
(2000) model, the demand would stay the same over certain price intervals, holding the 
quality levels constant, even when the price is changing. When crossing the threshold 
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between these price intervals, the demand will instantly jump to a new level. With given 
quality levels, the thresholds for a jump in demand is given by the reservation price for the 
two consumer groups. The Varian (2000) demand curve would have a shape like a two step 
staircase, the steps indicating the price threshold that triggers a jump in demand, and the 
drop between the steps indicating the price intervals where demand remains constant.   
3.4 Belleflamme’s simple model of Versioning 
Belleflamme describes how to achieve successful versioning (2005, page 332):  
“ The key is to identify some dimensions of the product that are valued differently across 
consumers, and to design the product line so as to emphasize differences along those 
dimensions. The next step consists in pricing the different versions in such a way that 
consumers will sort themselves out by selecting the version that most appeals to them.”  
In many ways this is very similar to the core principle of Varian’s (2000) model. But here we 
have a more mathematical build-up of how versioning works, and some important 
differences in the underlying assumptions addressed. Belleflamme (2005, page 333) starts 
with a case where a monopolist is choosing quality/price packages of an information good. 
Consumers are spread over a continuum based on their valuation, measured in  , of a 
specific key quality dimension of the information good. The consumers’ taste parameter   is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1], and consumers with high  -values have a high 
valuation of quality and vice versa. The monopolist can produce two different levels of 
quality for the information good along the key dimension, and the two quality levels are 
exogenously given.  The two quality levels are    and   , where         . Consumers are 
homogeneous with respect to their valuation of other quality dimension of the information 
good, and they have unit demands. The latter means that they buy a maximum of one unit 
each. The utility of consumers can be described in the following way, when consuming a unit 
with quality   , sold at price    and the consumer is  of type   (Belleflamme 2005, page 333): 
                                     
Where:      , is a measure of the common valuation for all other dimensions of the 
information good.  A consumer’s utility is equal to zero if she does not buy anything. It is also 
assumed that k <   . This implies that the consumer with the highest valuation of the key 
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quality dimension (   ) values even the lowest quality version available,   ,  more than all 
the other dimensions of the good combined.  
Belleflamme (2005, page 334) states the following situation for the monopolist:  
“He knows the aggregate distribution of the taste parameters but is unable to identify a 
particular consumer’s type.”  
The monopolist is faced with either making only one quality version and selling it at one 
price, or two quality versions and selling them at different prices, i.e. versioning. It is 
assumed that there is a constant marginal cost       of producing one unit of the good at 
quality   . Even a consumer with a low   will buy either version if priced at marginal cost, 
meaning     . Here are two assumptions that summarize how the parameters relate to 
each other: 
Assumption 1                          
Assumption 2                                      
  
  
              
Assumption 2 clarifies the condition that the cost of producing the high-quality (  ) version is 
not too large compared to the cost of producing the low-quality (  ) version (Belleflamme 
2005, page 334). 
3.4.1 Selling a single quality 
Given assumption 2 above, the monopolist will choose to make the high-quality information 
good,   , if he is only selling a single version. We let the consumer who is indifferent 
between buying the high-quality good and not buying anything be denoted as    (  ). If the 
consumer is indifferent it implies the following: 
→                    
→         
     
  
  
We know that all consumers with higher valuation of the quality dimension than the 
indifferent consumer,           , will choose to buy the good, and therefore the profit-
maximization problem for the monopolist becomes: 
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Solving the optimization problem gives the optimal price and profit expressions 
(Belleflamme 2005, page 334): 
     
         
 
 
     
           
 
   
 
3.4.2 Selling the two qualities 
When selling two different quality versions of the information good, Belleflamme (2005, 
page 334) states that the challenge is to find the profit maximizing price pair         that 
incentivizes some consumers to choose quality    and other consumers to choose quality   . 
Given the price pair        , the marginal consumer who is indifferent between consuming 
either of the two versions is called    . The consumer that is indifferent between buying the 
low-quality,   , version and not buying anything at all is called    . By definition we get the 
following expressions (Belleflamme 2005, page 335): 
                                        
      
      
 
                          
     
  
 
To be successful in segmenting the market the monopolist must set prices such that: 
            
If satisfied, this constraint will divide the consumers into two or perhaps even three groups: 
those who buy the    version, those who buy the    version, and also perhaps some 
consumers who buy nothing. The consumers with        will choose to buy the   , the 
consumers with           buy the    and, if      , the consumers with         
do not buy either of the two versions.  
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With these conditions we get two constraints that the prices must satisfy (Belleflamme 2005, 
page 335): 
(A)                                                     
 
(B)                                          
  
       
 
  
       
  
Belleflamme (2005, page 335) refers to these constraints as self-selection constraints, or 
“incentive-compatibility constraints”. (A) states that the price of the high-quality version 
must be lower than the price of the low-quality version plus the quality gap (valued by the 
consumer with    ). This condition is required for any positive sales of the high-quality 
version. (B) demands that the low-quality version must give the best ratio of quality to price, 
  
       
, of the two quality versions. This condition must be satisfied for there to be positive 
sales of the low-quality version (Belleflamme 2005, page 335).  
The purpose of the self-selection constraints are (Belleflamme 2005, page 335): 
“If  the menu              is to be feasible in the sense that it will be voluntarily chosen by 
the consumers, then consumers of each group must prefer consuming the package intended 
for them as compared to consuming the other group’s package or not consuming any 
package.” 
The price of the high-quality version,   , may also be expressed like this: 
          
That gives us the monopolist’s profit-maximization problem (Belleflamme 2005, page 335): 
   
   
                                                      
s.t. (A) and (B) are satisfied. 
First order conditions (FOCs) (2005, page 336): 
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The first of the FOCs illustrates that an increase in    has two separate effects on profits 
(Belleflamme 2005, page 336). First, revenues are increased from the consumers who buy 
either of the two versions. Second, revenue is lost on the consumers of the low-quality 
version who decide to leave the market when the price goes up. The second FOC shows that 
there are also two effects when increasing the premium for the high-quality version,  . 
Increasing the premium gives higher revenues from the consumers of the high-quality 
version, but some consumers will switch to buying the low-quality version instead. Since the 
low-quality version is sold on a different margin than the high-quality version,        
instead of       , this will also affect the monopolist’s revenues.  
Substituting the values of     and     into the FOCs and rearranging the terms Belleflamme 
(2005, page 336) solves for the profit-maximizing prices: 
     
         
 
       
              
 
        
         
 
 
The assumption that      implies that           ,  which means that consumers with 
very low values of   will not buy any version. Belleflamme (2005, page 336) explains for 
which values the parameters satisfy the self-selection criteria:  
(A’)                                      
(B’)                
  
        
 
  
        
   
  
       
 
  
       
 
Conditions (A’) and (B’) are merely expressions of (A) and (B) when the monopolist is using 
marginal-cost pricing, meaning         and       . When the conditions (A’) and (B’) are 
met, versioning is feasible (Belleflamme 2005, page 336). Bellow we will see what conditions 
must hold for versioning to be the most profitable strategy.  
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3.4.3 Cannibalization vs. market expansion 
Belleflamme (2005, page 337) explains the contrasting effects versioning has on the 
monopolist’s profits. When (A’) and (B’) are fulfilled the indifferent consumers are ranked: 
                                   
This ranking gives us an overview of the effects of versioning on the monopolist’s profits, 
which can be illustrated: 
 
Figure 8: Rendering of Belleflamme (2005, page 337) graphic describing versioning’s effect on monopolist’s profits. 
According to Belleflamme (2005, page 337):  
“the effect of versioning on consumers’ choices is twofold: because                      , 
fewer consumers buy the high-quality good; second, because                  , some 
previous non-consumers now buy the low-quality good.”  
The former is a cannibalization effect where some consumers migrate from the high-quality 
version to the low-quality version when that version becomes available. The latter is a 
market expansion effect where some who would otherwise not buy anything when only the 
high-quality version is on the market, now choose to buy the low-quality version. Note that 
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those who still buy the high-quality version after versioning takes place, the consumers with 
              , have no effect on profits since they pay the same price before and after, i.e. 
        . Belleflamme (2005, page 337) describes the negative effects due to cannibalization 
as follows: 
                                                    
              
                                        
           
   
 
Belleflamme (2005, page 338) defines the market expansion effect in this way: 
                                   
             
                                 
     
   
 
By summing up both the cannibalization and the market expansion effect, Belleflamme 
(2005, page 338) finds that versioning is the most profitable option given that the (A’) and 
(B’) conditions are met: 
                                    
                      
 
             
   
After having found this result for a very general versioning model, we look at some 
interesting cases where we know something more about the parameter values of the model. 
3.4.4 Is versioning optimal for information goods? 
As Belleflamme (2005, page 338) states, the perhaps most important characteristic regarding 
information goods is that the marginal cost of production remains constant for various 
product quality levels. In terms of the examples discussed so far this implies that        
 , where   is often near zero. If   is near zero, then assuming         is adequate to 
assure that (A’) and (B’) hold, and versioning remains the optimal strategy for the 
monopolist. Belleflamme (2005, page 338) explains that in the case of          we have 
the following result, proving versioning is optimal in this case: 
40 
 
              
      
   
   
               
     
   
      
     
          
Belleflamme’s (2005, page 338) main result on versioning for information goods: 
“Suppose the consumers’ utility for the information good can be separated along two 
dimensions: a “key dimension” for which consumers have different valuations, and a 
“secondary dimension” for which all consumers have the same, positive, valuation. Suppose 
also that some consumers value the key dimension more than the secondary dimension, and 
that the marginal cost of producing any level of quality for the key dimension is near zero. 
Then versioning the information good along the key dimension is the most profitable option 
for the monopolist.”  
This conclusion is similar to Varian’s result on versioning of information goods. Still, there are 
some important differences in how Belleflamme (2005) and Varian(2000) construct their 
respective models, as was discussed earlier. Both approaches prove that given certain 
conditions, versioning is a monopolist’s optimal pricing strategy for information goods.  
3.4.5 Damaged goods 
Belleflamme (2005, page 339) also addresses Deneckere and McAfee’s (1996) article 
Damaged Goods. Deneckere and McAfee (1996) is more focused on manufacturing goods 
like electronics and chemicals. Manufacturing goods distinguish themselves in some 
important ways from the information goods that Belleflamme (2005) and Varian (2000) 
focus on. When producers damage a portion of their manufacturing goods in an effort to 
price discriminate through versioning, it typically costs them extra to do so. The marginal 
cost of the low-quality “damaged” good,   , is in fact higher than the marginal cost of the 
high-quality good,   . 
          
This is usually the case because a manufacturer will start off by making a high-quality 
product. The cheapest way to create different versions of that good is to damage a portion 
of the high-quality products instead of creating a new low-quality product version from 
scratch.  
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We assume that: 
       
According to Belleflamme (2005, page 339):  
“versioning can be feasible, and thus optimal, even if it is more costly to produce the low-
quality version of the product.”  
This is true since when          condition (A’) is satisfied, and if the cost of degrading 
the product (     ) is not too large then (B’) may also be satisfied.   
Belleflamme (2005, page 339) goes on to propose a different perspective where instead of 
assuming a higher marginal cost of degrading the product, we instead assume that there is a 
higher fixed cost associated with making the low-quality product,   . This approach might be 
more relevant in the case of information goods, where there might be some extra fixed costs 
associated with making a low-quality product, whereas reproducing that version has no 
extra cost once it has been created. Let          and let     denote fixed costs for 
making the low-quality product,   , by damaging the high-quality product,   . Given these 
assumptions versioning will be optimal if: 
                             
      
     
   
The expression above illustrates the maximum amount it is worth investing in the creation of 
a low-quality version. If this fixed investment cost exceeds the additional profit gained from 
versioning, it is more profitable to produce one version.  
 
3.4.6 A specific case of Functional degradation  
Functional degradation is common, particularly in the software industry. Cheap or free 
reader software versions are often offered while consumers have to pay for the full-version 
to be able to create and edit content. Belleflamme (2005, page 346) bases this model on 
Csorbe and Hahn (2003), describing it as a combination of: “versioning, damaged good 
strategy, network building through free version, and unbundling.” 
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In this case we look at a software product with a read and a write function. The software is 
offered in two versions: one read-and-write version and one read-only version. It is assumed 
that consumers have unit-demand, i.e. they buy at most one unit of the good. The 
consumers are described by a parameter,  , which is uniformly distributed from [0,1], and 
describes the consumer’s valuation of the two software functions, read and write. It is also 
assumed that demand for the two versions is positively correlated.   is the valuation for the 
write function, and    is the valuation of the read function, where    . In short, this 
particular case implies that a consumer who highly values one of the two functions will also 
highly value the other function (Belleflamme 2005, page 346).  
Belleflamme (2005, page 347) explains that the software product has two-sided network 
effects, due to the fact that consumers’ utility from having the reading function increases 
with the number of people who have the writing function. In other words, the more people 
who create content the more valuable it is to have the option of viewing that content. The 
other parameters used in the model:    and    are the price for the full version, with both 
read-and-write functions, and the read-only version, and    and    denotes the number of 
consumers who buy the full version and the read-only version respectively.  
Here is an illustration of the net utility of consumer   (Belleflamme 2005, page 347): 
      
                  
        
   
     
                                   
                                                        
             
   
  
The utility of buying the full version may be seen as a bundle of the two functions. The 
model assumes utility is (Belleflamme 2005, page 347):  
“additively separable in the two functions.”  
The first term in this utility function describes the utility the user receives from having access 
to the writing function. This utility is augmented through a network effect related to the 
number of people being able to read the content that the user can write with the full 
version. It seems reasonable that the more people who are able to read content created by 
this software, the more valuable it is to be able to write content. The second term in the full 
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version utility function shows the utility of having the read function. This utility is increasing 
in the number of people who have the write function, as this would imply more content 
being created that the user could read. Finally, the overall utility of buying the full version is 
reduced by the price of this version. The higher the price the less net utility the user will get 
from buying the full version (Belleflamme 2005, page 347).  
For the read-only version utility only comes from this particular function of the software. The 
price of this version reduces the overall utility. There is zero utility for the consumer if she 
buys nothing. According to Belleflamme (2005, page 347) there are two options for the 
software firm, either sell the full version only (pure bundling) or sell both the full version and 
read-only version (versioning or mixed bundling). 
 
Sell the full version only 
 Belleflamme (2005, page 347) points out that if the read-only version is not on the market 
we have that:      , which in turn gives the following utility function for buying the full 
version: 
         
      
The   
  variable has superscript e to indicate that it is an expectation of the number who will 
choose to buy the full version. Consumers make their buying decision simultaneously and 
base their decision on expected network size. This example is according to Belleflamme 
(2005, page 347) a case of a monopolist who is pricing a good with network effects. We find 
the consumer who is indifferent between buying the full version and not buying anything, 
  , by setting utility of buying the full version equal to zero (Belleflamme 2005, page 348): 
          
              
  
        
  
Belleflamme (2005, page 348) assumes that consumers have rational expectations, i.e. 
  
       . This gives us the following expression for the price of the full version: 
(6)        
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“Because of the presence of network effects, there might be more than one    (that is, more 
than one quantity) that satisfies the equilibrium condition (6) for a given price” (Belleflamme 
2005, page 348).  
Given the possibility of multiple solutions, Belleflamme (2005, page 348) uses the Pareto 
criterion to pick out the solution. This means that the optimal solution will be the largest 
possible    which satisfies the price condition (6), as a larger number of consumers will 
increase the network effect, and therefore the value of the product, and make everyone 
better off. Assuming everyone recognizes that they are better off in the Pareto optimal 
solution, consumers expect this outcome and therefore it will become the equilibrium. In 
other words, the Pareto optimal equilibrium becomes a self-fulfilling expectation.  
The optimization problem for the software firm can be described like this (Belleflamme 
2005, page 348): 
   
  
        
               
FOC: 
             
                  
                 
 
 
  
Belleflamme (2005, page 348) states that after checking the second-order condition, it is 
clear that solution 1 is a minimum and solution 2 is a maximum. Using the Pareto criterion, 
we assume solution 2 will be the outcome, and solve for the equilibrium price and profit 
(Belleflamme 2005, page 348): 
  
   
       
 
        
       
  
 
Superscript F stands for full version only. It should be noted that solution 1 is a real 
possibility where consumers expect no one to buy the software. As a side note to the theory, 
it is important to acknowledge that the assumption Belleflamme makes about consumers 
coordinating towards the Pareto optimal solution is not necessarily a realistic assumption for 
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all cases. If there are coordination problems which prohibit consumers from reaching the 
Pareto optimal equilibrium, we cannot rule out an outcome with zero customers and zero 
profits.    
Introduce the read-only version 
Now we have a scenario with two different product versions on the market, one full version 
and one read-only version. The consumer who is indifferent between the full version and the 
read-only version is denoted as    , and the consumer who is indifferent between buying 
the read-only version or not buying anything is denoted as    . The expressions for these 
consumers are as follows (Belleflamme 2005, page 349): 
      
     
          
             
             
      
  
     
  
      
               
  
   
  
For versioning to be successful the following must hold: 
            
Belleflamme (2005, page 349) assumes that the condition above holds and that the 
consumers have rational expectations about demand. Therefore we get the following 
demand expressions: 
          
             
With the equations we now have we can solve for the equilibrium price conditions 
(Belleflamme 2005, page 349): 
(8)                                      
(9)                      
Just like the one version case we looked at earlier we now have the possibility for multiple 
solutions that meet the price conditions. Belleflamme (2005, page 349), referring to Csorba 
and Hahn (2003), states that the solutions may be ordered by the largest   , as a larger    
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will also imply a larger   . Due to the Pareto criterion the solution with the largest pair of 
(     ) will be expected by the consumers and therefore be the solution in equilibrium. 
However, we should again keep in mind that this assumption by Belleflamme may not hold 
in the real world so we cannot rule out other possible equilibrium.  
Belleflamme (2005, page 350) then states the firm’s optimization problem in this way:  
   
    
                                           
                                     
Belleflamme (2005, page 350) solves for the unconstrained profit-maximizing values of    
and    in three steps. Number one, find the FOC with respect to   : 
(10)          
 
  
                 
Number two, plug the expression in (10) into the FOC with respect to   . This gives us: 
 
 
  
                          
The third step is to evaluate the two roots that are solution candidates for the equation we 
found in step two: 
                    
                
    
 
 
Solution 1 implies a negative    which defies our constraint. Solution 2 gives the following 
expressions (Belleflamme 2005, page 350): 
      
    
 
        
     
  
 
This will satisfy the constraint of the optimization problem if (Belleflamme 2005, 350):  
           
47 
 
       
    
  
       
 
 
 
Based on these criteria, we have two completely different outcomes to consider based on 
the value of  , and the second scenario has two sub-categories as well. Remember,    
measures the positive relationship between the valuations of the reading and the writing 
functions of the software product (Belleflamme 2005, page 350).   
1. The first case is that    , which means that the reading function is valued higher 
relative to the writing function (Belleflamme 2005, page 350). In this case there is no 
interior solution and it is not profitable for the firm to proceed with versioning. 
Therefore they will rather chose to just sell the full version, excluding the read-only 
product from the market. 
2. The second case is that    , which means that the reading function is less valued 
relative to the writing function. This means that versioning is profitable. Belleflamme 
(2005, page 350) details two separate scenarios if this is the case: 
 
a) If 
 
 
    , then    
   
 
, and    
    
  
 satisfy the constraints of the 
optimization problem. We then get strictly positive solutions for equilibrium 
prices (superscript V for versioning): 
  
   
            
 
 
  
     
   
            
  
 
This leads to the profit expression (Belleflamme 2005, page 351): 
    
       
   
 
 
Belleflamme (2005, page 351) confirms that          
 
 
    , which means 
that for this particular case versioning is more profitable than selling just the full 
version.  
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b) If     
 
 
, then the consumer has a very low valuation of the reading function 
relative to the writing function (Belleflamme 2005, page 351). In this case it is 
optimal for the firm to cover the entire market, which means that          
becomes a binding constraint. 
           
                  
                      
In other words, it is optimal for the firm to give away the read-only version. This     
means that the firm is facing the following optimization problem: 
   
  
             
      
 
 
            
 
 
 
       Based on these values Belleflamme defines the optimum for     
 
 
: 
  
      
   
 
 
     
 
 
 
                    Superscript 0 refers to the read-only version being free to all consumers.  
        Belleflamme (2005, page 351) points out that it is easy to check that: 
              
 
 
 
Belleflamme (2005, page 351) makes the following conclusion to this case of functional 
degradation: 
“Consider a software that combines a read and a write function. Suppose that consumers’ 
valuations for the two functions are proportional. As long as the reading function is valued 
relatively lower than the writing function, the seller finds it profitable to engage in 
versioning by selling a read-only version along with the full (read + write) version of the 
software. If the relative valuation of the reading function is sufficiently low, it is even 
profitable to give away the read-only version for free.” 
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3.5 Game theory 
The theory that has been reviewed so far assumed that the firm in question is a monopolist. 
The market power of having a monopoly may allow a company to adjust prices more or less 
freely to maximize profit. However, assuming that a company has this type of strong market 
power is more often than not an unrealistic assumption. Most companies have to adapt to 
competitors’ actions and behavior. To gain an understanding of the dynamics of 
competition, we will now review some basic game theory.  
An important corner stone of game theory is the Nash equilibrium which can be defined as 
follows (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005, page 445): 
“in a Nash equilibrium, each firm is doing the best it can given what its competitors are 
doing. As a result, no firm would individually want to change its behavior.” 
The last part of the quote is very important. Since each firm is choosing the best possible 
action given its competitors’ actions, there is no incentive for anyone to change their action, 
creating the equilibrium state.  
3.5.1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma 
A classic case in game theory is called the Prisoners’ Dilemma. The name comes from the 
fact that two prisoners are often used as an example to illustrate this particular game, 
although the result is transferrable to a whole host of situations. The story goes that two 
prisoners are separated, and have to choose individually whether to confess to their crime. 
Their actions will affect each other. If one prisoner chooses to confess to their crime and the 
other one does not, the one that did confess will receive a very short sentence and the one 
that did not confess will receive a very long sentence. If both prisoners choose to confess 
they both get a medium sentence. On the other hand, if neither confess, they both get short 
sentences, but not as short as if they were the only one to confess. There is therefore an 
incentive to confess, not knowing what action the other prisoner has chosen.  
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Here is an illustration of the game in the form of a payoff matrix (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
2005, page 455): 
 
 
 
                            
 
No matter what the other prisoner does, the best option for each of them is to confess, ergo 
confessing is the dominant strategy (Pindyck and Rubinfeld 2005, page 476). Because both 
prisoners have an incentive to confess, the Nash equilibrium in this game is that both 
prisoners confess and receive five year sentences. We can clearly see that if they both do not 
confess they are better off with only a two year sentence each. This is the core of the 
prisoners dilemma: how can they reach that better outcome? If they are able to coordinate 
it can be done. In business we sometimes see that firms refrain from aggressive competition 
because they know that it will hurt themselves. They are all better off by implicitly colluding 
to keep the prices at a higher level, which means higher profits for everyone (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld 2005 page 455).   
3.5.2 Dynamic games 
In the Prisoners’ Dilemma game discussed above the game is only played once, i.e. it is a 
static game. However, in business many games are played over and over again creating 
dynamic games, which may result in different Nash equilibriums. As was briefly mentioned in 
the paragraph above, when firms compete on prices they have to consider the long term 
effects of their actions. Setting a low price today will give your competitor the incentive to 
undercut you by setting a low price tomorrow, and it might be difficult to get the price back 
up again. In lengthy price wars all the players could suffer bad losses in profits. 
What is the outcome of the Prisoners’ Dilemma game, if it is a repeated game?  Based on 
Tirole’s (1988, page 432) theory I use an example where the players are two companies 
Prisoners’ Dilemma                                          Prisoner B 
 
          Prisoner A 
 Confess Do not confess 
Confess -5, -5 -1, -10 
Do not confess -10, -1 -2, -2 
Figure 9: Prisoner A and B can both choose between two actions: confess and not confess. For each 
possible outcome Prisoner A’s sentence is to the left and prisoner B’s sentence to the right. 
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competing in a duopoly. Every period, t, each company has to decide between two actions: 
to keep the prices high, or to cut prices. Here is the payoff matrix: 
 
 
 
 
In a matrix we see that to cut price is the dominant strategy for both companies. No matter 
what action the competitor chooses, cutting prices will give either company the highest 
possible profit. When they both cut price, they receive one in profit, and when they both 
maintain prices they receive five in profit. On the other hand, if one company cuts the price 
while the other company does not, the price reducing company receives ten in profit while 
the other company receives a loss in profit of negative ten. Assuming the game is played an 
infinite number of times, we can say that each company’s payoff is equal to the discounted 
value of the payoffs they receive in each period into the future. Let the discount factor be 
denoted as  . We assume that both companies have perfect information, so in period t they 
both know what action their competitor choose in period t-1, and in all previous periods 
back to period 1 (Tirole 1988, page 432). 
Assume that the players come to an understanding that they will cooperate by maintaining 
the price at a higher level if, and only if, the other player never cuts their price. If either 
company deviates even once, the other company will respond by cutting prices and keeping 
them low forever. In a market with few competitors, such scenarios could easily arise, as 
each company realizes that the other actors are watching them closely, and are ready to 
respond to their actions at a moment’s notice (Tirole 1988, page 240).  Each company now 
has a choice to make: if you deviate you receive payoff: 
                                      
 
   
 
First period, the deviating company receives 10 in profit since he tricks the competitor. In 
every subsequent period though, he can only expect to receive 1 in profit, as the competitor 
Duopoly price competition                                          Company B 
 
          Company A 
 Cut price Maintain Price 
Cut price 1, 1 10, -10 
Maintain price -10, 10 5, 5 
Figure 10: Prisoner A and B can both choose between two actions: cut price or maintain price. For 
each possible outcome Company A’s payoff is to the left and Company B’s payoff is to the right. 
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punishes his deviation by cutting his price as well. On the other hand, if you do not deviate 
and your competitor keeps the agreement, you receive payoff (Tirole 1988, page 432): 
                                       
 
   
 
So for a company being willing to cooperate the following must hold: 
 
   
     
 
   
         
 
 
 
As we can see in the condition above, if   
 
 
 it is profitable to cooperate to keep prices 
high. This result allows for a new Nash equilibrium where both companies’ maintain high 
prices through collusion. However, it should be noted that both companies cutting prices is 
still a Nash equilibrium as it was in the static game. It is in no way certain that the companies 
would be successful in developing an understanding of keeping prices high. To achieve a 
Nash equilibrium of both companies maintaining high prices, a firm must be able to send a 
credible signal of its intention to keep high prices if the competitor complies. The competitor 
must also believe the threat that any sudden price cut will be punished harshly, with a 
punishment strong enough to outweigh any gains by deviating from the agreement (Tirole 
1988, page 432).  
3.6 Competition and versioning 
In all the versioning theory that was presented above, we assumed the firm was a 
monopolist. Now we will branch out to a competitive setting and see how this may change 
the results from versioning. However, this theory section will consist of more verbal 
argumentation as opposed to the mathematical approach earlier. The goal is to get a feeling 
for which direction competition will push the previous results of the monopolist based 
models.   
We start by acknowledging that versioning in fact does occur in competitive markets. Steen 
and Sørgard (2002) discuss versioning in the highly competitive and volatile airline industry. 
One might expect that, with fierce competition, the prices of airline tickets would be pushed 
down to marginal cost, often referred to as the Bertrand paradox of price competition. The 
paradox is that this form of equilibrium in price competition, which theory predicts, is not 
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common to find, even in highly competitive markets. The simplified model by Steen and 
Sørgard (2002) states that the airlines offer two types of tickets: cheap restricted tickets to 
leisure travelers, and more expensive flexible tickets to business travelers. Steen and Sørgard 
(2002) assumes that, with competition, there will be more capacity in the air travel market, 
and the main fear of the airlines is to have idle capacity, i.e. empty seats.  
Two approaches of responding to competition are outlined (Steen and Sørgard, page 10): 
1) Lower prices 
2) Focus on increased sales of low-quality leisure tickets 
Looking more closely at the latter, the firms can either lower the prices of leisure tickets and 
increase the number of such tickets on offer, or they can make them more attractive by 
improving the flexibility of the leisure tickets. Steen and Sørgard (2002) say that these 
actions should increase demand for the low-quality tickets. The increase in demand happens 
through both consumer migration from the business segment down to the leisure segment, 
and due to market expansion caused by new consumers entering the market to buy leisure 
tickets.  
With the consumer migration between the different customer segments, it is expected that 
demand for the business tickets will drop. In addition, the prices for business tickets may 
also drop due to the price competition in this segment, and because firms wish to limit the 
migration of consumers from the business down to leisure class. Steen and Sørgard (2002) 
concludes by saying that the size of these effects are unclear and hard to predict accurately. 
However, it seems logical to assume that, barring collusion between the airlines, the 
element of competition is likely to provide a downward pressure on prices for both the low- 
and high-quality ticket versions.  
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4. Analysis 
 
We have now established the theory needed to address the thesis question, and it is time to 
move on to the analysis section. A starting point is to create a benchmark model for a 
monopolist. After calculating and discussing the results of the benchmark model, we will in 
the next chapter apply these results to the Telenor case. 
4.1 The Benchmark Monopolist Model 
The purpose of this model is to show the optimal way a monopolist should set prices in 
relation to quality of mobile phone subscriptions with a data plan. Consumers have unit 
demand, meaning they will only buy one subscription each at most. A clear distinction is 
made between the data and telephony side of mobile phone subscriptions. The data side 
represents functions requiring internet access, and this is the key quality dimension that is 
used to differentiate the product versions. One subscription version has a data plan with 
access to mVoIP programs, and another version has a data plan without such access. The 
telephony side consists of all non-data functions of the subscription, like regular time-
charged calls, sms and mms. It is assumed that internet access may be viewed as an 
information good. So the marginal cost of providing data plans as part of the subscription is 
zero.   
However, there may be a fixed cost associated with developing a degraded version without 
mVoIP access. The term:  , will refer to any fixed cost that could be associated with 
developing the technology to block mVoIP access from mobile phones, or costs of lobbying 
to make this type of versioning an acceptable practice. In addition, there is also a 
cannibalization effect between the data side and the telephony side. The parameter   
represents the cannibalization effect each consumer with mVoIP access have on the 
revenues from the telephony side. For every consumer who choose to buy a subscription 
with access to mVoIP, we assume that a certain amount of telephony revenue,  , is lost, as 
mVoIP is used instead of regular time-charged calls.  
There are two quality levels, which are exogenously given, for the mobile phone 
subscriptions with a data plan. We assume that the monopolist may either block or allow 
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access to mVoIP, but that these are the only two available options for quality levels. The 
quality level without access to mVoIP is denoted as   , subscript D referring to this version 
being degraded. The quality level of the full subscription with mVoIP access is represented 
by   , the subscript V referring to the mVoIP access for this version. Since having full internet 
access would provide more choice for consumers, the full version is ranked higher than the 
degraded version,      .  
The term,  , describes the consumers’ valuation of quality with regards to the data plan 
included in mobile phone subscriptions. It is assumed that consumers’ individual values of   
are uniformly distributed over the interval      . To clarify, the consumer with     has the 
highest possible valuation of quality, and the consumer with     has the lowest possible 
valuation of quality. The assumption that consumers’  -values are uniformly distributed 
implies that the consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the data plan’s quality, 
which is an essential assumption for versioning to be a viable strategy. If all consumers 
valued every quality dimension equally, they would all buy the same version, making it 
impossible to segment the market through versioning.   
The term   refers to the valuation that the consumers have of all the functions on the 
telephony side of the subscription. In order to simplify the model, it is assumed that   is the 
same for all consumers. Like Belleflamme (2005), this model also assumes that     . This 
means that the consumer with the highest valuation of quality will value the degraded 
subscription,   , more than all the other non-data related functions combined. The      
assumption guarantees a positive demand for mobile phone subscriptions with a data plan.  
The utility associated with having access to mVoIP is also augmented by the number of 
people who have access to VoIP. A clear logical argument can be  made for why there is a 
network effect associated with mVoIP access: the more people that use VoIP services in 
general, on mobile devices or otherwise, the more people a consumer can reach when using 
mVoIP software, increasing the value of mVoIP services as a communication tool. The 
variable,   , represents the value of the network effect that consumers’ receive from having 
mVoIP access. When the number of VoIP users increases,     also increases. We know 
    , since many are using programs like Skype and Viber already, and it will grow with 
time if the user base of VoIP services continue to grow.  
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The prices for the subscriptions with and without mVoIP access are    and   , respectively. 
The prices represents a fixed payment for a subscription. Consumers will receive a free data 
packet in the subscription and self-ration their data use to not extend beyond that free data 
amount. So even though a consumer who buys a full subscription with mVoIP access may 
have a tendency to use more data than someone who buys the degraded subscription, it is 
assumed that the price paid for either subscription will cover the data usage for the 
consumers. This assumption is important to the outcome of the model, as it guarantees that 
mVoIP users impose a net negative cannibalization effect,  , on the monopolist from 
reducing revenue on the telephony side, which is not offset by any increased revenue on the 
data side.  
Below is a representation of the utility function for consumers: 
 
      
                                                                                 
                                                                                  
                                                                                                                                  
  
This utility function,     , shows consumers’ utility for three different options. The top line is 
a representation of the utility a consumer receives when buying a subscription that includes 
access to mVoIP. The middle line illustrates the utility a consumer will receive when buying a 
subscription without access to mVoIP. Finally, the bottom line shows that the consumer is 
assumed to receive zero utility if she does not buy any mobile phone subscription with a 
data plan. We continue by first finding the equilibrium results of this model in the case 
where the monopolist is only selling one subscription version. 
4.1.1 Selling only one quality version 
Similarly to Belleflamme (2005), we assume that in the case where the monopolist is not 
versioning, he will choose to only sell the high-quality version. In other words, when only 
selling one version of a mobile phone subscription with a data plan, the monopolist will 
choose to sell a full version including mVoIP access,   . To find the price and profit for the 
monopolist in this scenario, we start by finding an expression for the consumer who is 
indifferent between buying the full version with mVoIP access, and not buying anything.  
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We denote the indifferent consumer as    , and find the expression for this term: 
                      
     
     
      
 
Any consumer with a       will choose to buy the subscription. Therefore, the lower the 
value of    , the more consumers will choose to buy the subscription. A lower price or an 
increase in the number of people who use VoIP will lower     and increase the number of 
consumers who buy the full subscription. Since consumers’ individual  -values are uniformly 
distributed over the interval      , we can now find a demand expression for the full 
subscription:  
                     
With an expression for demand we can now define the profit function: 
                      
The subscript, 1q, refers to this being the profit function for the case where the monopolist 
is selling only one quality version. The term   represents, as was explained earlier, mVoIP’s 
cannibalization effect on the revenues from the telephony side. As the model also assumes 
no extra revenue from any increase in data usage, the net effect is a loss in revenue equal to: 
   , for every consumer that choose to purchase the full subscription,   . The 
cannibalization effect between the data and the telephony side of the business is the chief 
cause of concern that telecom companies have with the growing use of programs like Skype.   
 
To find the equilibrium price we maximize the profit function: 
   
  
                         
Differentiating with respect to    gives the following FOC:  
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Looking at the FOC, we see two distinct marginal effects on profit when the price,   , of the 
full subscription increases. First, the monopolist gains revenue from increasing the price on 
everyone who buys the subscription, represented by the term:               . At the 
same time, the monopolist also loses revenue by pushing some customers out of the market 
when increasing the price, illustrated by:        
        
   
  . The optimal equilibrium 
price is given by the price level where these two marginal effects cancel each other out to 
zero. 
The next step is to substitute in for         and 
        
   
, then solve for    (Appendix part 
A): 
      
            
 
 
The equilibrium price equation shows that the price of the full subscription is increasing in 
the number of people who use VoIP, and in the cannibalization cost,  , per consumer that 
choose to buy the subscription. The price is also increasing in the common valuation,  , of 
the telephony functions and in the quality level of the high-quality subscription,   . These 
last two parameters are however assumed to be exogenously given constants. Having found 
the expression for    , we can find the expression for equilibrium profit (Appendix part A): 
     
              
 
         
 
The equilibrium profit expression shows that profit from selling full subscriptions is 
increasing in the number of people who use VoIP, as this boosts the value of the network 
effect,   . A higher    will allow the monopolist to charge a higher price for product that is 
now more valuable in the eyes of consumers. On the other hand, profit is decreasing in the 
cannibalization cost,  , per consumer with mVoIP access. The higher   is, the more damage 
is done to revenues from the telephony side of the business per consumers with access to 
mVoIP services. Indeed, we can see from the profit function that if:             , the 
profit is zero. This means that for the monopolist to earn a positive profit on mobile phone 
subscriptions with mVoIP access, the cannibalization cost cannot be equal to or greater than 
the utility the consumer with the highest valuation of quality,    , receives from buying 
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the full subscription. After having found the expressions for both equilibrium price and profit 
when selling only the high-quality version, we move on to the two version case. 
4.1.2 Selling two quality versions 
With two versions on the market we need to find the consumer that is indifferent between 
buying the    or the    subscription, and the consumer that is indifferent between buying 
the    subscription or not buying any subscription. The former indifferent consumer is 
denoted as,    , and the latter as,     (Appendix part B): 
     
      
          
  
 
          
 
                                        
     
     
  
 
We can now define the demand expressions for the    and the    version: 
                                                            
From the expressions above we see that the demand for the    version is decreasing as the 
price difference between    and    increases and vice versa. However, the demand for    is 
increasing as the number of people who use VoIP increases. The demand for the    version 
is increasing as the price difference between the    and    increases and vice versa. The 
demand for the    version is also decreasing when the number of people who use VoIP goes 
up.  
As we now proceed to find the equilibrium prices, please note that the price of the    
version may be written as         . With the information we now have, we can move 
on to the profit maximization problem, the subscript 2q indicating that this is the two quality 
versions case: 
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The constraint written below the profit function above is the versioning constraint. If the 
versioning constraint is satisfied, we know that the solution is successful in segmenting the 
market, and that there are either two or three separate consumer groups.   
To find the equilibrium prices the first step consists of differentiating the profit equation 
with respect to    and  , giving us the FOCs (Appendix part B): 
(I)    
    
   
                 
        
   
    
 
(II)                                   
    
  
                    
       
  
    
In the FOCs above we see the various marginal effects of changing the prices. Examining FOC 
(I), we see two distinct marginal effects when the price,   , of the    version is increased. 
The first one is a positive increase in revenue from increasing the price on every consumers 
who buys either version, represented by the term:               . Remember that: 
        , so increasing    also effectively increases   , as   remains constant. The fact 
that a marginal increase in     also increases    , will cause the monopolist to set a higher  
   then he would have done if prices were not linked in this way. By setting a higher     the 
degraded subscription becomes a less attractive alternative for consumers of the full 
subscription, which allows the monopolist to keep     at a higher level without losing too 
many    customers to the    version. The second marginal effect is negative, and it comes 
from the fact that some consumers will decide to leave the market and not buy any 
subscription when the price,   , increases. This effect is illustrated by:   
        
   
  . 
The optimal equilibrium price is again given by the price level where the two distinct 
marginal effects cancel each other out to zero.  
Looking at FOC (II), where the price premium,  , on the    version marginally increases, 
there are also two distinct marginal effects. The first one is the increase in revenue from 
increasing the price on everyone who purchases the    version, represented by:    
          . The second marginal effect comes from the consumers who choose to buy 
the    version instead of the    version, when the price on the    version goes up. This 
marginal effect is illustrated by:        
       
  
            . The latter marginal effect 
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of FOC (II) is ambiguous, due to the cannibalization that the    subscription inflicts on 
revenues from telephony services. If we assume that    , the price premium for the    
version outweighs the cannibalization costs. Therefore, the monopolist loses revenue when 
consumers choose to switch from the    version to the    version, i.e. the marginal effect is 
negative. On the other hand, if    , then both marginal effects of FOC (II) are positive, and 
it would actually be profitable for the monopolist when consumers switch to the    version. 
The optimal price premium is the premium where the two marginal effects equal out to 
zero.  
The second step is to plug in the expressions for    ,    , 
        
   
 and 
       
  
 into FOCs (I) 
and (II), and solve for the equilibrium prices (Appendix part B): 
      
     
 
 
 
    
             
 
 
 
      
            
 
 
Looking at the expressions for the equilibrium prices we see that price for the full 
subscription,    , is still the same as in the one version case we looked at earlier. This is 
parallel to the result that Belleflamme (2005) found in his Simple model of versioning. By 
increasing    the monopolist allows for    to remain unchanged, i.e.        , without 
risking too many consumers switching from the    version to the    version. It is increasing 
in the number of people who use VoIP and in the cannibalization cost per consumer that 
buys this version. The price premium,  , is increasing in the quality difference between the 
full and the degraded subscription, and in the cannibalization cost of the full subscription. 
The price for the degraded version,    , is determined by the valuation of the telephony 
functions,   , and the quality level of the degraded data plan,   . Both of these parameters, 
along with   , are assumed to be exogenously given constants. 
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After having found the equilibrium prices when the monopolist is versioning, we can plug 
these expressions into the expressions for     and    , and check what parameter values 
are allowed under the versioning constraint (Appendix part B): 
                                   
                                                        
The expression above states that the cannibalization factor,  , cannot be greater than the 
additional utility that mVoIP access gives the consumer with the highest valuation of quality, 
i.e.    . The term,           , is also the same as the maximum price premium,  , that 
a consumer with,    , is willing to pay for mVoIP access. If             , the price 
premium on the    version would not be able to recover the losses from cannibalization of 
telephony revenues, even when charging the reservation price for the consumer with the 
highest valuation of quality. This would mean that versioning is not profitable and it would 
be better to only sell the    version, and block mVoIP access altogether. So the assumption: 
            , is necessary for the monopolist choosing to sell the    version, when 
only selling one quality version. 
We continue to look at the conditions that must hold to satisfy the versioning constraint 
(Appendix part B): 
                    
        
     
 
  
    
                      
      
  
  
The inequality in the middle above, shows that the quality to price ratio has to be higher for 
the degraded subscription than the mVoIP subscription, in order to guarantee positive 
demand for the    version. The term,      
      
  
   , to the right of the inequality to 
the right above is negative given the previous assumption,      , and     . So the 
inequality,        , holds given our assumption that the cannibalization effect from 
mVoIP on telephony revenues is significant, i.e.    . The last part of the versioning 
constraint is (Appendix part B): 
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With the previously stated assumption,     , the inequality above holds as a strict 
inequality, 
 
  
  . So the solution does satisfy the versioning constraint,      , and we 
see that there are three consumer groups that can be distinguished by their  -values: 
                                        
                                          
                                
Even though versioning is successful in segmenting the market, it is not necessarily more 
profitable than selling only one version. The next important step is to compare profits for the 
two cases: selling only one quality version and versioning.  
4.1.3 Versioning vs. selling only one version 
There are two distinct effects of versioning that Belleflamme (2005) described, which we 
look at here as well. One of them is the cannibalization effect between the different product 
versions when a degraded version is introduced. When the monopolist offers a degraded 
subscription,   , some consumers that otherwise bought the full subscription,   , when only 
that was on offer, will now switch to the    version. Keep in mind, this is a completely 
different cannibalization effect than the one represented by  . The cannibalization effect 
that the degraded version has on the full version is expressed as follows (Appendix part C): 
                                             
 
              
                                      
                     
   
As the expression above shows, the cannibalization effect between the product versions is 
negative, given the condition             . That is because the consumers who switch 
from the full version to the degraded version now pay a lower price than before. To put it 
another way, the consumers switch from buying a high margin product to buying a low 
margin product.  
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The second effect that we need to take into account is the market expansion that occurs 
when adding the degraded version,   . By putting the    version on the market, new 
customer will choose to buy this version. These consumers would not buy any subscription 
with a data plan before, when only the    version was available. The market expansion 
effect can be expressed the following way (Appendix part C): 
                             
        
                            
           
   
The market expansion effect is of course positive as new consumers enter the market that 
would otherwise choose to not buy any subscription with data plan.  
Like Belleflamme (2005) illustrated, we can compare the profits made from versioning with 
the profits made from selling only the high-quality version by adding up the market 
expansion and cannibalization effects (Appendix part C): 
                                    
                     
 
                    
    
Let us start by examining the fraction term in the result above. The numerator is squared 
and therefore has to be positive, and the denominator is also positive given the previous 
assumptions that were made for the parameters: 
      
                     
 
                    
   
So whether or not versioning is the most profitable strategy in the Benchmark Monopolist 
model will depend on the size of the fixed costs of implementing versioning,  . If we assume 
that   is smaller than the sum of the cannibalization and market expansion effect, versioning 
will be most profitable. However, if   is greater than these two effects combined, selling 
only one version will be most profitable. The result is somewhat ambiguous, but at least the 
Benchmark Monopolist model does not discount the possibility of versioning being a 
worthwhile strategy. The model shows that versioning is profitable if it can be implemented 
at a reasonable cost, and if             .  Now we will continue with a discussion on 
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how changes in   and    could alter the results of the Benchmark Monopolist model, and 
summarize the model’s most important points. 
4.1.4 The results of the Benchmark Monopolist model  
We can start by taking a look at prices. As we saw above, versioning had no effect on the 
price of the    version, similar to Belleflamme’s (2005) result. Like Belleflamme (2005), the 
model recognizes that an increase in    makes the    version less attractive relative to the 
   version, allowing the monopolist to increase    as well. This link between the two prices 
causes the monopolist to set    such that    remains unchanged after versioning has been 
implemented.  
Even though the price of the    version remains the same when versioning, the number of 
people who buy this subscription goes down, as some consumers switch to buying the    
version instead. At the same time, the total number of customers increases when the 
degraded subscription is introduced, as some new customers choose to enter the market to 
buy the    version. Since the price of the    version remains the same, and the total number 
of customers increase, it seems clear that consumer welfare is improved through versioning 
in the Benchmark Monopolist model. The degraded subscription version brings new 
consumers with lower valuation of quality into the market, without punishing consumers 
with higher valuation of quality through increasing the price of the full subscription.  
If the fixed cost of implementing versioning,  , is smaller than the net revenue increase from 
combined cannibalization and market expansion effects,          , the monopolist is 
also better off with a versioning strategy. We can show that versioning becomes increasingly 
profitable compared to only selling the    version, with a marginal increase in  , assuming 
          . Differentiating the sum of the cannibalization and market expansion 
effects with respect to   gives us a mathematical illustration (Appendix part D): 
            
  
 
                        
                    
   
Remember that   is a measure of the cannibalization effect on revenues from the telephony 
side, per consumer who buys the    version with mVoIP access.  Therefore the result above 
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is as expected, since a larger   reduces the magnitude of the negative cannibalization effect, 
and increases the positive market expansion effect.  
The former can be explained by viewing   as a marginal cost associated with the    version. 
The larger   becomes, the smaller is the margin that Telenor earns on selling the    version, 
and therefore, the smaller is the loss per consumer who switches from the    version to the 
   version. On the other side, an increase in   will lead to an increase in the number of 
consumers who switch from buying the    version to buying the    version, when the 
monopolist starts selling the degraded subscription. The reason for this increase in consumer 
migration between the product versions is that a higher   pushes up the price for the    
version, making the    version a more attractive alternative. However, the net result from 
an increasing   is that the negative cannibalization effect becomes smaller in absolute value 
(Appendix part D). 
The latter effect that an increase in   has, is on the market expansion from versioning. This 
is explained by β’s influence on the indifferent consumers. The  -value for the indifferent 
consumer when the monopolist is only selling the    version,         , will increase as   
increases. The reason for this is that a higher   will push up the price,    , reducing the 
number of consumers who choose to buy the    version. This leads to a greater gap relative 
to the consumer that is indifferent between buying the    version and not buying anything, 
when selling two versions, i.e. an increase in the size of this difference:                  . 
An increasing   will therefore mean that a greater number of new customers enter the 
market when the monopolist implements the versioning strategy (Appendix part D): 
     
  
 
     
         
   
It should be emphasized again that, if the assumption:           , does not hold, 
then only selling the    version is the best option for the monopolist, and not versioning.  
A marginal increase in the value of the network effect,   , will have two conflicting effects 
on the cannibalization effect from versioning. On the one hand, the number of consumers 
that would choose to switch from the    subscription to the    subscription, when it enters 
the market, goes down. The reason behind this is that an increase in    increases the utility 
of having the    version, making the    version a less attractive alternative. In a pure 
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mathematical sense this implies that the difference:                       , is reduced. But 
there is also a negative another effect. When    increases, the price of the    version also 
increases. So for every consumer that does decide to switch to the    version, the loss is 
now greater as the difference in profit margins between the two subscriptions have 
increased. The net result on the cannibalization effect from a marginal increase in    is 
positive, 
     
   
  , if (Appendix part D): 
         
                 
  
               
     
However, the net result is negative , 
     
   
  , if (Appendix part D): 
         
                 
  
               
     
A marginal increase in    would also have two contradictory effects on the market 
expansion from versioning. First a higher    makes the    version more valuable in the eye 
of consumers, which means that more consumers will chose to buy it when the monopolist 
is only selling this version. Therefore the difference:                  , will become 
smaller, thereby reducing the market expansion effect. On the other side, a higher    will 
also lead to a higher price for the    version. This will have a diminishing effect on the 
number of people who buy the    version, and increase the difference,                  . 
A marginal increase in    therefore also has an increasing marginal effect on the market 
expansion from versioning. If    , the net effect of a marginal increase of    is an increase 
in the positive market expansion effect. The opposite is true if     (Appendix part D). 
The overall effect of a marginal increase in    on the change in profit from versioning is also 
dependent on the size of  . If   
             
           
, then the net effect of an increasing    is 
positive on the change in profit from versioning, i.e. 
            
   
  . The opposite is the 
case if   
             
           
, (Appendix part D). If we assume that    , a marginal increase in  
   will cause an increase of the market expansion effect and a decrease in the 
cannibalization effect from versioning. This assumption is also equivalent to saying that the 
consumer with the lowest willingness to pay for quality,    , is willing to buy the    
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version, if it is priced at the marginal cannibalization cost,  , between mVoIP subscriptions 
and telephony revenues. After now having constructed and calculated the results of the 
Benchmark Monopolist model, it is time to apply these results to the Telenor case.  
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5. Application of analysis to the Telenor case 
We start applying the insight of the analysis with the assumption that Telenor is a 
monopolist, which is a fundamental assumption in the Benchmark Monopolist model. Later 
on, the perspective is also broadened to a competitive setting to see how this will influence 
the results. This chapter ends with an honest assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of 
the Benchmark model, as it relates to the Telenor case.    
 
5.1 Telenor as a monopolist 
The Benchmark Monopolist model indicates that it will be profitable for Telenor, as a 
monopolist, to implement versioning, assuming that the fixed cost of doing so,  , is not too 
high: 
                     
 
                    
   
and that: 
(A)                                                                      
If the inequality (A) does not hold, then blocking mVoIP completely and only selling the    
subscription is the most profitable option for Telenor. However, we assume for now that the 
inequality does hold. Versioning would allow Telenor to expand its market for mobile phone 
subscriptions with data plans, by offering a degraded subscription for consumers with less 
willingness to pay for quality. The degraded subscription might also help slow the growth of 
mVoIP services, and thereby limit the cannibalization of telephony revenues, as some 
consumers switch from the mVoIP subscription to the degraded version. Even though this 
consumer migration does imply a cannibalization effect between the product versions 
themselves, this specific cannibalization cost is outweighed by the gains of market 
expansion. The price of the    subscription also remains the same after the    subscription is 
introduced. Therefore, this versioning strategy does not force the customers who buy the 
full subscription to pay more for mVoIP access, but it allows those who do not value mVoIP 
access so highly to pay less for internet access on mobile phones without mVoIP.  
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This result deviates somewhat from the intention that Telenor and other telecom companies 
seem to have, by limiting mVoIP. Based on some of the statements made by telecom 
companies in the media, their hope is to be able to charge a higher price for subscriptions 
with mVoIP access (E24 and Picard). However, the benchmark model indicates that the price 
should stay the same for mVoIP subscriptions, while new customers brought into the market 
by the degraded subscription will give Telenor as a monopolist increased profits overall, 
from versioning. 
With time as all forms of VoIP services evolve, improve and grow their user base, the size of 
  might change. Better mVoIP services and applications in the future will pose an even 
greater threat to revenues from regular telephony services, as consumers will be more 
inclined to switch to this alternative technology. When we differentiated the change in profit 
from implementing versioning with respect to  , we saw that an increase in   will make 
versioning a more profitable option. This result is conditioned on assumption (A) being 
satisfied. So it seems that if mVoIP, or VoIP services in general, continue to take over for 
traditional telephony services, i.e.   grows, it will become more and more likely that the 
gains Telenor receive from versioning will outweigh any fixed costs of versioning. Since 
Telenor and other telecom companies are expressing concern regarding mVoIP (E24 and 
Picard), we might view this as a signal that   is in fact growing.  
In the Benchmark Monopolist model also analyzed how a change in the value of the network 
effect associated with mVoIP access,   , would change the prospects of versioning. The 
results are dependent on the size of  . If   
             
           
, then the net effect of an 
increase in    is an increase in the change of profit from versioning, and vice versa. Since: 
  
             
           
         , the condition (A) does not give us enough information to 
accurately judge the impact of an increase in   . All we know about the size of   by the 
given assumptions, is that:             . However, we know that an increase in    
will make the full subscription more valuable in the eye of consumers, allowing Telenor to 
increase the price,   , on the    subscription. If we assume:  
(B)                                                         ,  
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a marginal increase in    will lead to an increase in the market expansion effect Telenor 
receives from versioning, and a decrease of the cannibalization effect between the product 
versions. The reason for the latter is that a higher margin on the full subscription means a 
higher loss for Telenor on every consumer that switches to the degraded version.  
Overall, the Benchmark Monopolist model indicates that versioning, if not already a 
profitable strategy, might become an increasingly profitable option for Telenor over time. 
Assuming   will grow within the bounds of condition (A), whatever fixed costs that are 
associated with implementing versioning,  , will become less and less significant. The impact 
a change in    will have on the incentive to implement versioning is more unclear. Moving 
on, it is now time to look at how the element of competition could influence the results of 
the benchmark model.   
5.2 The effects of competition 
In the benchmark model a fundamental assumption is that Telenor is a monopolist. This 
assumption gave the company market power which allowed them to manipulate prices. 
However, in the industry characteristics section earlier we saw clearly that Telenor is not a 
monopolist. NetCom with its own network is a serious competitor to Telenor. There are also 
many other smaller competitors, without their own networks, that Telenor has to take into 
account. Comparing the telecommunications sector in Norway with other OECD countries, 
we also see that prices for telecom services are low in Norway relative to other industrialized 
economies. This would seem to indicate that the telecom market in Norway is highly 
competitive on prices. So in a context of intense competition, what would the consequences 
be for Telenor if they attempt the strategy of versioning? 
We can view this as a game resembling the Prisoners’ Dilemma. To simplify we limit the 
players to Telenor and NetCom. They can each choose between either only selling one high-
quality subscription,   , with mVoIP access, or they can choose versioning, by adding a new 
degraded subscription,   , without mVoIP. What happens if Telenor goes ahead with a 
versioning strategy while Netcom does not? Originally, both companies only sell the    
version. Assuming both companies have the same price for this high-quality subscription, 
they share the market evenly, with a 
     
 
 market share each. When Telenor introduces the 
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   version at a lower price, both companies lose customers for the    subscription, as some 
will choose to switch to buying the    version instead. However, since Telenor is the only 
company selling the    version, they get all these migrating customers, as well as new 
customers that now enter the market. NetCom’s response to Telenor taking their customers 
is to cut the price on the    version, winning over all the high-WTP consumers in the market 
who buy the    version, and also winning back some of the consumers who migrated to the 
   version.  
Since it is very easy for customers to switch telecom providers, Telenor, by versioning alone, 
endures a heavy loss due to an exodus of customers. The versioning company might also be 
hurt by the fact that some customers are angry about them trying to block a popular service, 
mVoIP, and these customers might choose to go to the competitor in protest. The non-
versioning company gains a significant increase in customers and profits, despite having cut 
prices. In short, the versioning company incurs a significant loss in profits, as the company 
that did not go ahead with versioning gains a significant increase in profits.  
The game can be illustrated in a payoff matrix:   
Versioning and competition                                                             Netcom 
 
Telenor 
 Not versioning Versioning 
Not versioning 1, 1 10, -10 
Versioning -10, 10 5, 5 
 
 
In the payoff matrix above, each of the four cells in the bottom right corner shows the 
payoffs from each of the four possible outcomes. The numbers represents profits, so the 
higher the number, the higher the profits are for the company.  Telenor’s payoffs are to the 
left in each cell, and NetCom’s payoffs to the right. We see that there is an incentive for both 
players to not pursue versioning in this game, regardless of what the competitor is doing. 
Therefore, keeping the status quo of selling only one version,   , is the dominant strategy 
for both players. The Nash equilibrium is the top left cell in the payoff matrix. In this 
equilibrium, both companies earn a profit of 1. They could potentially be better off if they 
Figure 11: This figure illustrates a payoff matrix of a game, where Telenor and Netcom in a duopoly have to 
choose  whether or not versioning will be profitable. The game is assumed to resemble a classic Prisoners’ 
Dilemma. 
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decided to pursue a versioning strategy together, which would give both a profit of 5. So the 
next question we should ask is: how can the companies reach an equilibrium where they 
both are versioning? 
It is possible to reach a solution where both Telenor and Netcom are versioning. To reach 
this goal Telenor needs some form of assurance that their competitor will follow their lead if 
they implement a versioning strategy. In a recent article Telenor’s Chief Information Officer 
said in relation to blocking mVoIP (Appendix part E for English translation): 
“Vi følger utviklingen i nabolandene nøye, men i Norge har Telenor ikke planlagt å innføre 
mekanismer som legger slike begrensninger på kundenes bruk. Men vi må vurdere ulike 
scenearier fremover, og det kan for eksempel være aktuelt å se på samarbeid med andre 
aktører om denne type løsninger” (E24 2012). 
This statement could be seen as a step forward in creating a common understanding in the 
Norwegian telecom market that versioning is beneficial for all. Netcom has also made similar 
statements in the media. Communications Consultant at NetCom, Charlotte Erikstad, said on 
the topic of limiting mVoIP access (Picard 2011): 
“Vi følger utviklingen nøye, og på sikt vil det nok skje noen endringer på dette området. 
NetComs kunder vil alltid ha muligheten til å bruke MVoIP og vi vil legge til rette for dette 
ved å sikre god tjenestekvalitet, men i fremtiden vil det ikke være gratis” (Appendix part E 
for English translation). 
It is important to send the signal that it would be in the interest of all the telecom companies 
to move in the direction of versioning, and that this should become the new industry 
standard. In addition, Telenor needs to make clear that if any competitor would rather try 
and undercut them to steal customers in the short term, this will only spark an even more 
intense competitive environment over the long term, hurting every telecom provider. If the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma style game described above is stretched out over a longer time horizon, 
undercutting your competitor might look more like this:  
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The graph above illustrates how the threat of a price war could be an incentive for 
competitors to collude instead of undercutting each other. The blue line represents profits 
over an extended period of time for a company that undercuts its competitor who is going 
ahead with versioning. The red line represents profits over an extended time horizon for a 
company that is colluding with its competitor in implementing a versioning strategy. Even 
though the short term gains of undercutting your competitor might be tempting, the long 
term sustained losses of a price war works as a deterrent against escalating price 
competition. This is not a static game, so Telenor will have the opportunity to respond to 
their competitor’s response, should NetCom choose to undercut them.  
The size of the cannibalization parameter,  , is a key factor. If the cannibalization effect that 
mVoIP subscriptions have on the telephony side is growing, as the use of programs like 
Skype becomes more widespread, Telenor could forcefully make the argument that the 
industry needs to adapt sooner rather than later. If they hesitate and stick their head in the 
sand, they could risk that revenues from time charge calls, the largest source of revenue in 
mobile services, declines significantly, without having any clear strategy to offset these 
losses or slow this trend. Telecom companies could increase the protection of their revenue 
stream from the telephony side by versioning, which will make some consumers give up 
access to mVoIP in exchange for a cheaper degraded subscription. Revenue from 
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subscriptions is already increasing its share of mobile services revenue, and could in the 
future be a significant compensating factor for lost time-charged calls and SMS revenues.  
If we now assume that the telecom companies all agree to move to versioning, how does 
this competitive versioning equilibrium compare to a monopolist versioning equilibrium for 
Telenor? With the increased competition, it would seem reasonable to assume that prices 
for both the full subscription and the degraded subscription will be lower in a competitive 
setting than in a monopoly. Without the market power that a monopoly position can offer, 
Telenor is forced to accept lower prices to avoid losing too many customers to its 
competitors. But there is now the possibility of sharing the fixed cost,  , associated with 
implementing versioning in practice. For example, if   involves the development of a new 
technology, a joint venture among industry actors could help share the research costs 
between them. Overall one would expect Telenor to make less profit when versioning in a 
competitive setting than in a monopolist setting, but as a strategy it would still be preferable 
if competitors can be convinced to come along as well. As the biggest company in the 
Norwegian telecom market, Telenor is most likely in the best position to take a leadership 
role on versioning and move the other industry actors with them into a new equilibrium that 
is more beneficial for everyone.  
After having applied the analysis to the Telenor case, it is now time to assess how well the 
model fits reality. In the next section we take a critical look at strengths and weaknesses of 
the benchmark model.  
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5.3 Weaknesses and strengths of the model 
Before accepting the results of the analysis it is important to question the assumption upon 
which it is based. Are the assumptions reasonable, and what real world complexities does 
the model fail to reflect? 
In the case of only selling one quality version, it was assumed the monopolist would choose 
to sell the high-quality subscription,   , with mVoIP access. This is of course similar to what 
is happening today, as Telenor has not yet blocked mVoIP services, although they are 
differentiated their subscriptions along other dimensions. As mVoIP access is free and open  
today, the assumption of the monopolist only selling the high quality subscriptions seems 
acceptable as a benchmark. 
It is also reasonable to assume that consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of 
quality of internet access. Some call abroad more than others, and therefore have more to 
gain from using mVoIP, which is a lot cheaper for international calls than regular time-
charged calls. Business professionals may have different needs from a mobile phone 
subscription than residential customers, and so on. A uniform distribution of  -values is 
perhaps a simplification, but it does reflect some form of variation in consumers’ valuation 
of quality in the subscription data plan.      
However, the model does not capture any other variation in consumers’ valuation of quality, 
beyond the data plan dimension. We know that telecom companies offer subscriptions with 
varying amounts of free SMS and call minutes, or cheaper service fees when calling or 
texting family and friends. Clearly there are also other dimensions along which it is possible 
to differentiate mobile phone subscriptions. Therefore, it does not seem obvious that all 
consumers would have the same valuation of telephony services,  .  Allowing for   to vary 
among consumers would perhaps make the model more realistic, and might also influence 
the results of the Benchmark Monopolist model. 
Since Telenor and other Norwegian telecom companies are not blocking mVoIP today, one 
could argue that the condition (A):             , is satisfied. If (A) did not hold, it 
would be more profitable to block mVoIP from mobile phones altogether, and only sell the 
degraded subscription. On the other hand, there may be factors like competitive pressure, 
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legal issues and lack of technological solutions, that are stopping Telenor from blocking 
mVoIP completely. As was stated in the introduction, Telenor and other telecom companies 
have expressed concern regarding this cannibalization effect,  . Also, according to the Body 
of European Regulators for Electronic Communications (BEREC), there is evidence of VoIP 
services being blocked in Europe, for the most part on mobile networks (BEREC 2012). So 
some European telecom companies have already taken the step of limiting access to VoIP 
services, although the nature and extent of this practice is unclear.  
I do not attempt to estimate the value of the   parameter in any empirical way in this thesis. 
As Swedish telecom companies are in the process of implementing some form of versioning 
with respect to mVoIP, and Norwegian telecom companies are assessing this option 
seriously (E24), it seems reasonable to assume that   is at least significant,    , and 
perhaps even pushing the bounds of condition (A). In the review of the market 
characteristics for the Norwegian telecom industry, we saw that traditionally big revenue 
groups in mobile services, SMS and time-charged calls, are declining. Further increase in the 
use of mVoIP services should only exacerbate this trend. In other words, there is most likely 
a positive correlation between    and  .  The more people use mVoIP programs, the less 
useful regular telephony services become, and as these services lose value in the eyes of 
consumers, they will also lose revenue potential. However, the benchmark model does not 
include the possible relationship between the    and   parameters. 
The prices in the model are fixed prices for mobile phone subscriptions, including a free data 
amount. It is assumed that consumers will self ration data usage, thereby not exceeding the 
free amount included in the subscription. This assumption may not hold in real life. 
Consumer who buy the high-quality subscription with mVoIP access might use more data on 
average than other consumers, and therefore tend to exceed any free data amount. If this is 
the case, the cannibalization effect that mVoIP subscriptions have on telephony revenues 
would be somewhat offset by increased data revenues. So if the self rationing assumption 
does not hold it could for instance mean a smaller effective   than the benchmark model 
implies.  
Furthermore, limiting the market to mobile phone subscriptions with data plans is also 
somewhat problematic. How would dedicated mobile data subscriptions, or regular mobile 
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subscriptions affect the results, if included in the model? An introduction of a degraded 
subscription could perhaps cause some consumers who use regular mobile phone 
subscriptions with no data plan, to switch to the degraded subscription with a data plan. 
With access to a free data amount, these consumers might start sending more messages via 
data, further impacting the revenues from regular SMS messages. In other words, adding a 
degraded version could potentially cannibalize other Telenor products, and not just the    
subscription. Dedicated mobile broadband subscriptions are also open to mVoIP programs. 
Would it be necessary to version this market segment as well, if the goal is to limit the 
cannibalization of telephony revenues in a significant way? The Benchmark Monopolist 
model does not include these possible substitute products, and how they may affect the 
result. It is important to keep this in mind. 
The model treats mobile phone subscriptions with data plans as information goods. An 
argument for this assumptions is that the cost of building the telephone network may be 
seen as a fixed sunk cost. So the capacity already exists, and one extra consumer using the 
network will not cause any significant increase in costs for the telecom provider. Therefore, I 
think the assumption of equating subscriptions with data plans to information goods is 
tenable, which is why the marginal costs of the product versions are zero. However, the 
negative cannibalization effect that mVoIP subscriptions have on telephony revenues may be 
viewed similarly to a marginal cost for the    version.  
The value of the network effect associated with using mVoIP,   , is treated as an exogenous 
parameter, and the monopolist maximizes profit by setting prices. However, the prices will 
determine the number of consumers who buy the mVoIP subscription, which will in turn 
affect the value of   , which affects the utility consumers receive from having access to 
mVoIP, and therefore the price consumers are willing to pay for mVoIP subscriptions. 
Treating    as an exogenously determined variable does not sufficiently account for the 
network effect when maximizing profit. As we saw in Belleflamme’s (2005) Specific case of 
Functional Degradation, when maximizing profit with respect to network effects there might 
be more than one equilibrium.  Given the possibility of coordination problems among 
consumers, it is difficult to figure out which equilibrium state the market will reach. For 
instance, if suddenly mVoIP subscriptions become more expensive relative to a degraded 
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subscription, one cannot rule out that the market eventually ends up in an equilibrium 
where almost no one buys the    version.   
Finally, I should reiterate what was mentioned briefly in the introduction. The model and 
analysis does not look deeply into legal or technical issues related to the implementation of 
versioning. The model assumes some fixed cost,  , of versioning, but it is unclear what size 
this fixed cost might take. Does the technology or mechanisms exist that would allow the 
telecom companies to block programs like Skype from certain mobile phone subscriptions? If 
there is a huge backlash from consumers who are angry at telecom operators trying to 
introduce a degraded subscription with limited internet access, the whole process could 
become very unpredictable, especially in a highly competitive setting. And what about 
companies like Skype? They might take legal action against telecom companies trying to limit 
their market. It is important to acknowledge such complications in light of the analysis 
results. 
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6. Conclusion 
 
It is time to summarize the main points of the analysis and to answer the thesis question: 
Is it profitable for Telenor to pursue a strategy of versioning by creating two types of 
mobile phone subscriptions: one with access to mVoIP services, and one without access to 
mVoIP services? 
The Benchmark Monopolist model showed that versioning may be profitable, depending on 
the size of the fixed cost of implementing this strategy,  . As the cannibalization factor   
marginally increases, versioning will become a more profitable strategy. However, if 
            , then selling only the degraded subscription,   , and blocking mVoIP 
altogether would be the most profitable option. But it is not certain that blocking mVoIP 
completely is a viable option given possible legal constraints and the fear of consumer 
uproar. The effects of a marginal increase in    is somewhat ambiguous, but it should 
increase the price and demand of the mVoIP subscription. How it affects the prospects for 
versioning is dependent on the size of  . 
Moving on from the results in the Benchmark model, we took a look at how versioning in a 
competitive setting will affect the outcome. Based on dynamic game theory, there is an 
argument to be made for how Telenor could achieve an equilibrium where all telecom 
providers in Norway chose to implement versioning. To reach this equilibrium, Telenor must 
be successful in sending a clear signal that versioning will benefit all actors. At the same 
time, the threat of a lengthy price war will serve as a deterrent to anyone who are tempted 
to undercut the implementation of versioning. In an already highly competitive Norwegian 
telecom market, more intense price competition is probably something most telecom 
providers would like to avoid.  
As a result, the analysis indicates that there is a path forward for Telenor to pursue the 
strategy of versioning. It could potentially increase profits through market expansion and 
limit the damage that mVoIP services inflict on revenue from telephony services. The latter 
effect of versioning would be especially important if:             , and blocking 
mVoIP altogether is not a realistic option. For a versioning pricing strategy to succeed, 
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however, Telenor will need to persuade competitors to follow its lead for the optimized 
financial benefit of all.  Finally, we must also acknowledge that this conclusion is bounded to 
the assumptions of the Benchmark model. As we discussed in the previous chapter, there 
are weaknesses to the model and they could affect these results. 
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7. Appendix 
7.1 Part A 
Below are the complete calculations for equilibriums price and profit for selling only one 
quality version. 
Equilibrium price: 
   
     
      
         
 
      
   
                       
      
            
 
 
 
Equilibrium profit: 
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7.2 Part B 
Below are the calculations for indifferent consumers, FOCs , equilibrium prices, and the 
parameter conditions under the versioning constraint, for the case of selling two quality 
versions. 
Indifferent consumer expressions: 
                              
                        
     
      
          
  
 
          
 
                                        
               
     
     
  
 
 
Profit maximization problem with versioning constraint: 
   
    
                                                   
                   
FOCs: 
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Finding equilibrium prices: 
(I)       
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Checking what parameter conditions satisfy the versioning constraint: 
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7.3 Part C 
Below are the calculations of the cannibalization effect, market expansion effect and both 
effects added together. These expressions are discussed in the Versioning vs. selling only one 
version section. 
First we need to find another expression for the indifferent consumer when selling only one 
quality version: 
         
     
      
  
           
         
 
 
 
  
   
         
 
 
Cannibalization effect: 
 
                                             
           
 
 
 
 
              
   
 
 
  
   
         
   
     
 
  
            
 
  
 
              
                                      
                     
   
 
Market expansion effect: 
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Adding up the cannibalization and the market effects: 
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7.4 Part D 
Below are the differentiations with respect to   and   , of the change in profit, and the 
cannibalization and market expansion effect from versioning. 
Differentiating change in profit when versioning with respect to  : 
          
                     
 
                    
 
 
            
  
 
                        
                    
   
Given the assumption made about the parameter in the model we know that the fraction 
about is positive, proving that 
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Differentiating change in profit when versioning with respect to   : 
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If the inequality above holds, a marginal increase in    will lead to an increase in the change 
in profit from versioning. The opposite is true if the inequality is reversed. 
Differentiating the cannibalization effect from versioning with respect to  : 
 
                                              
     
  
  
 
            
 
 
         
  
          
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
            
 
   
         
  
The first product in the equation above is negative and the second product is positive. Next 
step is to check the condition: 
     
  
   
   
 
 
 
 
            
 
   
         
   
 
            
 
 
         
  
          
 
  
 
                                            
                            
                                 
                           
                             
                    
On the left side in the expression above, the first term in the product,     , is positive and 
the second term,         , is negative given the assumption made about the parameter 
values. This proves that the inequality holds, and that the cannibalization effect is dampened 
by an increase in  , i.e. 
     
  
  . 
Differentiating the cannibalization effect from versioning with respect to   : 
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Differentiating the market expansion effect from versioning with respect to  :  
      
                            
           
 
     
  
 
     
         
   
Since we know from our assumptions about the parameters that the fraction above is 
positive we can say that a marginal increase in   will increase the market expansion effect, 
i.e. 
     
  
  . 
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Differentiating market expansion when versioning with respect to   : 
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7.5 Part E 
Below are the Norwegian quotes from the section: The effects of competition, followed by 
the English translations: 
In a recent article Telenor’s Chief Information Officer said in relation to blocking mVoIP: 
“Vi følger utviklingen i nabolandene nøye, men i Norge har Telenor ikke planlagt å innføre 
mekanismer som legger slike begrensninger på kundenes bruk. Men vi må vurdere ulike 
scenearier fremover, og det kan for eksempel være aktuelt å se på samarbeid med andre 
aktører om denne type løsninger” (E24 2012). 
English: 
”We are following the developments in our neighbouring countries closely, but Telenor has 
no plans of implementing mechanisms that put such limitations on the consumers use in 
Norway. But we have to review various scenarios for the future, and it may for instance be of 
interest to cooperate with other actors with regards to these types of solutions” (E24 2012) 
 
Communications Consultant to Netcom, Charlotte Erikstad, said on the topic of limiting 
mVoIP access (Picard 2011): 
“Vi følger utviklingen nøye, og på sikt vil det nok skje noen endringer på dette området. 
NetComs kunder vil alltid ha muligheten til å bruke MVoIP og vi vil legge til rette for dette 
ved å sikre god tjenestekvalitet, men i fremtiden vil det ikke være gratis” (Appendix part E 
for English translation). 
English: 
”We are following developments closely, and in the future some changes are likely to be 
made in this area. NetCom’s customers will always have the option of using MVoIP and we 
will make sure of that by guaranteeing good service quality, but in the future it will not be 
free.”  
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